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COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF TECHNIQUES FOR EVALUATING 
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF AIRCRAFT COMPUTING SYSTEMS 
Ellis F. Hitt, Michael S. Bridgman, and Alfred C. Robinson 
BATTELLE 
Columbus Laboratories 
SUMMARY 
The objective of this study was to evaluate "performabi1ity", a 
technique developed by the University of Michigan under NASA Grant NSG 1306, 
for its accuracy, practical usefulness, and cost of use. Performabi1ity 
analysis determines the probabilities of occurrence for a set of mission 
outcomes. It was designed for application to fault-tolerant computing systems 
used in mu1tiphase missions. Performability was found to require significantly 
more time to learn and understand that the fault-tree method. 
Performability and the fault trees were applied to a set of sample 
problems ranging from simple to moderately complex in nature. The problems 
involved up to five outcomes, two to five mission phases, permanent faults, 
and some functional dependencies. Two to six times as much clock time was 
required to apply performabi1ity as fault trees. Much of the performability 
effort was mechanical in nature. More ingenuity was required for the fau1t-
tree solutions. Initial results from the methods often disagreed. Detailed 
analyses revealed the results were sensitive to mathematical procedures 
followed in dealing with small differences, round-off procedures, programming 
procedures, and the computer used. The use of only one method would not have 
revealed this sensitivity. As an observation, both methods appear to provide 
more precision than can be supported by available data. 
For most problems of practical interest, fault trees will be more 
useful than performabi1ity analysis. For highly complex problems, performa-
bi1ity may offer advantages in solution accuracy and required solution effort. 
If performabi1ity analysis is to be further developed, then tutorial material 
should be written, the probability computation program should be validated, 
and further mechanization of the technique should be investigated. 
LIST OF STANDARD SYMBOLS 
{ } Set 
U Union -; 
Intersection -, 
~ Summation ~ 
1T Product ...... 
P ( ) or Pr ( ) Probability 
E( ) Expected value 
-1 Inverse of the function y y 
Element of (a set) 
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INTRODUCTION 
Various techniques exist for evaluating the effectiveness of aircraft 
computing systems. These techniques have been used for assessing primarily the 
reliability and safety of flight control systems and digital avionics. The 
techniques are generally mathematical models which may be manually applied or 
may be implemented in computer programs. These models are normally used 
rather than testing techniques to determine the reliability to avoid the cost 
of performing reliability testing. 
With the development of fault tolerant computing systems, testing 
becomes even more impractical because of the many fault tolerant architectural 
concepts that are possible and the fact that testing requires that the system 
design be committed to hardware and software. Techniques are required that can 
be used to design fault tolerant computing systems as well as evaluate the 
design of candidate fault tolerant computer systems prior to the actual devel-
opment of the hardware and software which implement the candidate design. New 
techniques such as that developed by the University of Michigan under NASA 
Grant NSG-1306 must be evaluated against a proven technique prior to widespread 
application in order to assure that the results obtained are valid. This in 
itself poses a problem, since many of the proven techniques either are unwieldy 
and very time consuming when applied to systems of moderate complexity, or do 
not properly treat software errors, transient failures, and other features of 
fault tolerant systems. The total system must be analyzed and not just a 
portion such as the hardware components or the software. The nature of the 
systems to be analyzed are categorized by the complexity of relationships among 
system elements under the control of a software executive program. This 
complexity can lead to an intractable analysis problem for a completely general 
system. Many of the techniques, such as that developed under NASA Grant 
NSG-1306, assume some simplification by combining or partitioning system 
states. 
The objective of this report is to present the results of an 
evaluation of the practical usefulness of the techniques developed under NASA 
Grant NSG-1306 compared to other techniques such as the "conventional" fault 
tree analysis. These comparative analyses were made based upon data obtained 
from actual application of the techniques to hypothetical systems in realistic 
2 
mission environments. The sample problems were solved using the NASA Grant 
NSG-1306 techniques (referred to hereafter in this report as "performability 
analysis"), fault tree analysis, and the Tabular System Reliability Analysis 
(TASRA). 
The first-level problem is a simple series-parallel problem which 
was used primarily to verify the researcher's understanding of the respective 
techniques and to obtain a preliminary comparison of the relative ease with 
which the techniques could be applied to a simple problem not involving time.,or 
environmental dependency. The results are basically a reliability measure 
involving both levels of component failures and degraded component performance. 
, 
The second problem considered by the analysts involved a dual-dual 
fJight control system and a simple mission scenario consisting of a takeoff/ 
climb phase, a cruise phase, and a descent and landing phase with Category II 
weather at the scheduled destination. 
The third problem required the analysts to analyze a digital flight 
control system which possessed some of the features of the Fault Tolerant 
Multi-Processor (FTHP) architecture developed by C. S. Draper Laboratories. 
The objective of all analyses was to provide a comparison of the 
techniques for each of the three problems. This comparison involves assessment 
of the comparative and absolute difficulty in applying the techniques to 
arrive at the cost measure including the staff time and costs involved in 
learning the techniques as well as the staff time and costs involved in applying 
the techniques to each of the problems. 
This report presents a synopsis of the techniques considered, a 
description of the fault tolerant system designs analyzed and the scenarios 
for each of the problems, and a comparative analysis of the results obtained 
by each analyst for each of the system designs analyzed. The final section of 
the report presents the conclusions and recommendations based upon the analyses 
performed. 
-, 
\ 
-; 
\ 
...... 
I 
.-
ro. 
I , 
I ' 
i \ 
3 
SYNOPSIS OF TECHNIQUES 
SYNOPSIS OF PERFORMABILITY ANALYSIS 
Performability analysis is the name given to a technique for evaluating 
the effectiveness of aircraft computing systems. The technique has been under 
development at the University of Michigan since November 1976 as a research 
project for NASA Langley Research Center under NASA Grant NSG-1306. This 
brief synopsis of performability analysis is intended to summarize the technique 
and to establish pertinent definitions. No attempt is made to explain the 
theoretical development or to explore the more sophisticated aspects and 
capabilities of the technique. Detailed material on performability analysis is 
contained in References 1-9. 
Overview 
Consider an aircraft computing system used in a multiphase mission. 
The system user (e.g., the airline) can define a set of mission outcomes, which 
is called the "accomplishment set". The accomplishment set has the form A = 
.. , an} where the ai are "accomplishment levels". An example 
accomplishment level is "safe, on-time, fuel-efficient flight". The 
"performability" of the system is the set of probabilities of realizing each 
of the accomplishment levels. In mathematical terms, the performability is 
... , 
where P(ai) = probability of outcome ai occurring. 
On a detailed (i.e., component) level, the system behavior is viewed 
as a stochastic process X = {X(t) ItET} where X is the state of the system 
s t 
(e.g., a computer and its environment) at time t and T is the set of times 
at which the system is observed. For a mission with m phases, observations can 
be made at time zero (t ) and at the end of each phase (t., j = 1,2, ... , m). 
o J 
Let Q represent the state space of the system. Then each X(t) is an element of 
Q. Let q. = X(t.). A particular instance of system behavior is given by the 
J J 
"trajectory" 
j..l = (qo' ql' q2' ..• , qm)· 
The space of all possible trajectories is called the "trajectory space" and is 
denoted by U. 
4 
Each trajectory ~eU corresponds to a single mission outcome aeA. This 
mapping is denoted as follows: 
y:U+A. 
and y is called the "capability function". 
The two basic steps of performability analysis are: 
Step 1. For each accomplishment level aeA, find 
y-l (a) = set of all trajectories ~eU which 
result in the outcome "a". 
Step 2. For each aeA, compute the probability of 
occurrence of y-l (a). Then, 
Pea) = Pr[y -1 (a)]. 
I 
T~ese steps are explained in more detail in the following subsections. 
Step 1. Find y-l (a) \ 
For simple systems, the set y-l (a) can be determined by inspection 
of the base model trajectories. As more complexity (e.g., more components, 
phases, interdependencies, outcomes) is introduced, it beco~es increasingly 
difficult to determine y-l (a) in a single step. A hierarchy of models can 
be used to determine the capability function (i.e., to connect the base model 
trajectory space U with the accomplishment set A). 
-
, 
While any number of intermediate models could be used, this discussion ~ 
uses two: a mission model, also called the "level 0" model, and a function, 
or "level 1", model. The base model is called the component or "level 2" 
model. Figure 1 summarizes the model hierarchy. Each level has an associated 
trajectory space which describes the possible mission profiles in terms of the 
state space for that level. The level 0 state space could consist of parameters 
representing such mission characteristics as safety, economics, and/or 
operations. For levell, the state space could consist of the functions to 
be accomplished, such as flight augmentation, navigation, and flight control. 
It could also include environmental variables such as the weather at the 
destination. The base level model could then be expressed in terms of the 
components which comprise the system. Model level j is related to the next 
"lowest" level (j-l) by a function denoted Kj. These functions are defined by 
the nature of the system and its mission requirements. 
r. 
; , 
r-
I , 
i \ 
, 
I ' 
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A 
f\ 1 KO \ 
UO \ 
Accomplishment Set 
Level ° (mission) 
TKl y = 
Level 1 (function) u' 
Level Z (component) uZ 
~2 
U 
FIGURE 1. SUMMARY OF PERFORMABILITY ANALYSIS 
MODEL HIERARCHY 
KoK1KZ 
inverses 
2 ~EU , 
and 
6 
-1 The set y (a) is formulated by sequentially constructing the 
-1 K. and linking them together. For each base model trajectory 
J 
For each mission outcome a<:A, first find 
-1 KO (a) = set o~ all mission level trajectories 
in uO which result in outcome "a" 
= {wEuOIKO (w) = a}, 
Next, for each wEKO-l (a), find 
Kl-l (w) = set of all function level trajectories in u1 
which result in mission trajectory w. 
Taking the union of these sets for all wEKO-l (a) gives 
Kl-l (KQ-l (a)) = (KQKl)-l (a) 
In a similar fashion, find 
= set of all function level trajectories in Ul 
which result in outcome "a". 
K2-l «KOKl)-l (a)) = (KQKlK2)-1 (a) 
= set of all base level trajectories in U2 
which result in outcome "a". 
= y-l (a). 
Each single-step inverse is accomplished using "projection" functions. 
The determination of (I<b,Kl)-l (a) given ~ -1 (a) will be used as an example. 
All trajectories are expressed as matrices. (Vectors and single variables 
are special cases of matrices.) Let w E KO-l (a) and let C2 denote 
the 2th component of w. The 2th projection function, denoted ~2, simply 
maps the matrix w onto its 2th component, c2. The first need is to determine, 
for each component of w, the set 
(~2Kl)-1 (C2) = {all trajectories Ul which, when mapped to 
UO, have the value c2 for the 2th component} 
- {v <: ~1~2 (Kl(v)) = C2}. 
The-intersection of these sets for all components of w E KO is the set of 
all trajectories in ul which, when mapped to UO, have cl for the first 
component, c2 for the second component, and so on. This is exactly the set 
~ 
. , 
-
I ' 
; , 
} \ 
r 
I ., 
,-
7 
I 0 
of all trajectories in U which map to w s U. Symbolically, 
KI-I (w) = n (~R, KI)-l (CR,). 
All R, 
Computing the (~R, KI)-l (CR,) sets requires knowledge of the system, its 
environment, and the mission. Computing the intersection is a purely mechanical 
process. The inverse image KI-I (w) can thus be found for every w s KO-
I (a). 
The union of all these inverse images is (KOKI)-l (a). 
Step Z. Compute Pr [y-l (a)] 
The first step was to determine y-l (a), the set of base model 
trajectories which result in the mission outcome "a", for every a s A. In 
this step, the probability of the set y-l (a) occurring is computed. The 
method for performing the computations uses the fact that each inverse image 
of an element (e.g., KI-I (w)) is a Cartesian set*. Furthermore, each inverse 
of the outcome "a" (e.g., (KoKI)-I(a)) is a union of disjoint Cartesian sets. 
The inverse image of "a" in the base model trajectories can be written as 
y-l (a) = VI U Vz U ••• U V s 
where each Vi is Cartesian and Vi n Vj = <P for i #j. 
Hence, Pr [y-l (a)] = Pr (VI) + Pr (VZ) + ... + Pr (Vs ) 
and each Pr (Vi) must be computed. 
Suppose V is a Cartesian set and there are m phases in the mission. 
Then V can be written as 
V = RI x RZ x ••• x Rm 
where each Rk is a subset of the state space of the system. Assume there are 
n possible states in the state space. The initial state vector is 
1(0) = [Po(l) po(Z) ••• po(n)] 
where Po(i) = probability the system is in state i at the start of the mission. 
The intraphase transition matrix for phase k gives the state transition 
probabilities for the state space: 
*Definition of a Cartesian set: Let Q be some set and let V be a subset of 
QxQ; that is, every element of V is of the form (ql' qZ) where qi e Q. If 
there exist two subsets of Q, say RI and RZ' such that every element of 
V is of the form (rl, rz) where rl sRI and rz sRZ, and every combination 
(rl, rz) is in V, then V is Cartesian. 
8 
where Pk (i, j) = probability the system is in state j at the end of phase 
k given the system was in state i at the start of phase k. If the base model 
is a Markov process, then the Pk (i, j) are the Markov transition probabilities. 
The "characteristic matrix" for the set V and phase k is 
G = [g k (i,j) 1 V,k v, 
where 
(' ') {1 if i = j and if state i is in set ~ gv ,k ~,J = -K 
a otherwise. 
Multiplying the intraphase transition matrix Pk on the right by GV,k puts 
zeroes in those columns of Pk which correspond to states not in ~ (and therefore 
not in the set of trajectories which comprise V). In other words, GV,k selects 
those columns of Pk corresponding to the phase k outcomes in the trajectory 
subspace V. 
where 
For the last (mth) phase, the characteristic matrix becomes the vector 
f(l) 
F(m) = f(2) 
f(m) 
~ if state i is in R f(') m ~ = 0 otherwise. 
The use of a column vector is to sum the probabilities of being in any of 
the acceptable final states. 
Using these quantities, the probability of V is: 
Pr(V) = 1(0) (P1G1 ) (P 2G2 ) ••• (P 1G 1 )(P F(m)). , v , v m- m-, v m 
,. 
-
, 
--I 
: \ 
r-· 
: ' 
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Summary 
This synopsis of performability analysis summarizes the nature of the 
technique. It does not address all of the capabilities or important aspects 
of the technique, some of which are: 
o Transitions between phases 
o "Lumping" of states to reduce the number of states 
~ needed for the computations 
r 
.-
.-
,-
: ' 
o Modeling of non-l1arkov stochastic processes. 
For further details, the reader is directed to References 1, 2, and 3. 
THE FAULT TREE METHOD 
Fault trees have been widely used in many types of reliability 
analysis, since development of the technique in the early 1960's. The 
major area of application has been the study of safety problems in nuclear 
reactors (10 ,11)*. A general review of applications and computational aids is 
given by Fussell, Powers, and Bennetts (12) . The technique is conceptually 
quite simple, though application to realistic problems may be laborious. 
There are two aspects of the methodology which will be discussed 
separately: (1) construction of the fault itself and (2) computation of the 
probabilities of the events considered. In some applications, only the first 
aspect is used. In the present study, both are required. 
Construction of the Fault Tree 
The starting point for each fault tree is the selection of some 
particular event (usually an undesirable event) for study. In most problems 
there is more than one type of failure to be considered. In such cases, a 
separate fault tree must be developed for each type. Examples would be: 
(1) Loss of aircraft through control failure 
(2) Loss of all aircraft position information 
(3) Loss of Category II landing capability 
(4) Loss of RNAV capability. 
* Superscript numbers in parentheses refer to items in the Reference List. 
10 
This fundamental event to be studied is sometimes designated as the "Top 
Event", since it occurs at the top of the fault tree as usually drawn. 
Once the top event has been selected. the next step is to enumerate 
all the ways in which the top event can happen. This enumeration is done 
through use of a specific type of graph structure known as a tree, hence the 
name fault tree. 
If a given top event T can be caused by anyone of the other events 
A, B or C, this can be depicted schematically as shown in Figure 2. 
FIGURE 2. FAULT TREE WITH "OR" GATE 
The notation of an "OR" gate is used to denote the fact that anyone of the 
events A, B or C can cause T. The events A, Band C could be mutually 
exclusive or not. They could be statistically independent or not. Each 
of the events A, B, or C could be the top event in another fault tree. For 
example, there could be several other events which could cause A. 
If T is caused by the presence of two or more events, the dependence 
is indicated as in Figure 3. 
FIGURE 3. FAULT TREE WITH "AND" GATE 
-, 
.--. 
; , 
! ' 
i , 
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....--, 
, 
r 
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This means that all three events A, Band C must occur in order to 
cause T. Again, A, B or C could be the top event of another tree. 
The construction of a complete fault tree proceeds from the top 
down. The top event is defined, and those events leading to the top event 
are defined. Then those events leading to the events just below the top 
event are defined. This continues until a level of fundamental events is 
reached. The nature of this fundamental level can be selected for the purposes 
of a particular problem. It could be failures of fundamental components such 
as resistors or solder joints. It could be failure of major subsystems, such 
as an inertial navigation unit or a particular computer function. 
In concept, this is all there is to the construction of fault trees. 
In considering specific problems, however, considerable ingenuity may be 
required to fit the problem into this framework. For example, in the fault 
tree, there is no explicit recognition of time. This can be overcome, at 
least in many cases, by time-related definition of events. For example, a 
top event could be defined as loss of control during a specific period of 
time, such as final approach and landing. If there is more than one time 
period of interest, it may be necessary to construct a different fault tree 
for each time period, and for each top event in each time period. Conceptually, 
this is a simple approach, but the labor involved in constructing many fault 
trees could be considerable. 
Also, it is necessary for the analyst to have a very good under-
standing of the system being analyzed. It is important that all ways of 
reaching the top event be portrayed in the tree. There is no general way to 
assure this, but the more the analyst knows about the working of the system, 
the less likely he is to overlook failure-producing events or combinations of 
events. 
Determination of Failure Probabilities 
Once a fault tree has been developed, it may be desirable to determine 
the probability of the top event. In order to do this, it is necessary to 
know the probabilities of the fundamental events. If the fundamental events 
12 
are independent, the determination of probabilities is relatively straight-
forward. 
The situation of Figure 2 leads to the relationship 
where PT is the probability of the top event, and PA, PB and Pc are the 
probabilities of the contributing events. If the probabilities are small, 
as is usually the case, this is well approximated by 
In the situation of Figure 3, the probability is computed from 
Probability computations start at the bottom of the tree with the fundamental 
events and proceed upward, using the above formulas at each stage until the 
top event is reached. 
If events are not all independent, more complex computations may 
be required, but standard probability theory covers these cases. For problems 
of this type, special analytical methods and computer programs have been 
developed (13,14) . 
TASRA SYNOPSIS 
General Discussion 
The TASRA (Tabular System Reliability Analysis) model was developed 
by Battelle for performing reliability analyses of complex systems. It is 
well suited for this purpose in that the model can simulate real-world situations 
in which a malfunction occurs in the system with major portions of the system 
remaining operational, as well as a complete failure of the system. Most 
reliability models do not accommodate the malfunction situation readily. 
The TASRA model used by Battelle to analyze and predict system and 
major assembly reliability is computer-based and configured so that the 
detailed functional inter-relationships of the subject system are represented 
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by the reliability model. Thus, failure of a subassembly or assembly in the 
real system will have the same effect on system operation as the reliability 
model depicts. If failure of one assembly causes a major system failure, the 
model will faithfully represent it. If failure of another assembly only 
degrades system operation, as determined by engineering analysis, the effect 
will be reflected in the probability of occurrence for that particular 
malfunction state without changing a related MTBF which is based on a failure 
state. 
In a TASRA analysis, the term "malfunction" means a sometimes accept-
able degradation in functional performance (e.g., three channels down out of 
five or transmitting at reduced power) while "failure" is used to indicate 
~omplete cessation of functional performance of the component or assembly 
(e.g., five channels down out of five). Thus, the failure of a subassembly 
could cause either a malfunction or failure of the next higher-level assembly 
depending on the functional interrelations between the two in the system. 
Such system-specific details can be represented by the TASRA reliability model 
used in this analysis. The model generates reliability data at each level 
of the system hierarchy, and for each failure state or defined malfunction 
state. These can be combined into a MTBF for a higher level if so desired • 
Because of the operational realism TASRA offers, it can also be 
used as a tool to assist the system designers in achieving an improved trade-
off between cost and reliability if desired. Early in the design/development 
cycle, the first iteration of the computer program will provide reliability 
predictions based on inputs of part failure rates or estimates of assembly 
reliability at the system level at which information is available. Given 
this initial information, the computer will predict a value of system reliability. 
If it is unacceptable, the computer outputs can be studied to identify those 
areas that need improvement to bring the HTBF up to an acceptable level. 
Changes in system design or reliability of the parts procured for particular 
assemblies can be evaluated to estimate the effects on the overall system 
reliability. In parallel with this, cost studies can be conducted to determine 
the impact of these changes on the cost of the system. Thus a TASRA analysis 
provides information that can be used in establishing the relationships between 
cost and reliability of a system. 
14 
Overview of TASRA Modeling Procedure 
As Figure 4 shows, the user of the Tabular System Reliability 
Analysis (TASRA) model must generate a functional description of the total 
system, and of its subsystems, major assemblies, subassemblies, etc. The 
most important criteria in this step is to select "building-blocks" such 
that a failure of each is logically independent of the failure of the other 
building-blocks at that system level. A diagram is prepared to doucment 
this partitioning at each level. This level-by-level. set of partitioned 
functional diagrams is one of the basic inputs the analyst must prepare to 
use the TASRA computer model. Input information from system designers 
knowledgeable in total system operation is usually necessary during this step. 
Another concept essential to an understanding of the TASRA model is 
that of system states. The state of the system (from an operational reliability 
perspective) can be: 
1) Fully operational, as the specifications define it, or 
2) Failed (complete cessation of functional ability) --
called failure state, or 
3) In one of several degraded operating modes -- called 
malfunction states. 
The TASRA model can be used to predict the probability of occurrence of each 
state defined for each level of the system at which an analysis is conducted • 
. This can be expressed as a mean time between failure (MTBF) or average time 
between occurrence (ATBO). 
The analyst documents failure and malfunction state definitions work-
ing through the system level by level. Several iterations may be required 
to develop a consistent set of state definitions for each system level. 
The decision portion of the analysis begins when the bottom of the 
procedural diagram of Figure 4 is reached. A bottom-up decision process of 
recording the system state that would occur as a consequence of each possible 
combination of 1-, 2-, and 3-at-a-time failures of the building-blocks for 
the system level under study is conducted. This is completed on standard 
tables developed by Battelle for this purpose. 
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Figure 5 represents the flow of activities that take place at a 
given level within the system while carrying out t;he TASRA procedu're. The 
activities on the right deal with functional partitioning, state definitions, 
and decisions and documenting of failure consequences. The activities on the 
left of the figure relate to reliability data inputs and when necessary, 
estimates of building-block reliability. Figure 6 then puts together the 
one-level activities of Figure 5 into the analysis of the entire system. 
As illustrated in Figure 6, the procedure of Figure 5 is repeated 
at each level of the system until the analysis is completed up to the top 
level of the system hierarchy. At this point, one iteration of the TASRA 
system reliability model is complete, and reliability estimates (probabilities 
of state occurrence) are available for all of the failure and malfunction 
definitions at each system level. These probabilities may also be presented 
as MTBF's by the computer which is programmed to assume exponential distributions 
for this calculation. The calculations may be iterated as required to 
incorporate new data or changes in system structure. 
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SCENARIOS AND FAULT TOLERANT SYSTEM 
DESIGNED AND ANALYZED 
SERIES-PARALLEL DESIGN 
A simple series-parallel problem, depicted in Figure 7 was the first 
problem analyzed to verify the researcher's understanding of the respective 
techniques and obtain a preliminary comparison of the relative ease with which 
the techniques could be applied to a simple problem not involving time or 
environmental dependency. The subsystems depicted in Figure 7 each have one 
failure mode and all subsystem failures are independent. There is no failure 
sensing for each of the subsystems and there is no possibility of repair. The 
failure of each subsystem is equivalent to that of an open circuit. Subsystems 
C and D are parallel redundant with branch operation of either assuring 
system success. Branch A-B is parallel redundant with branch C-D, that is 
either branch yields system success. Investigators were instructed to assume 
an exponential permit failure rate (Poisson distribution). The data for 
each subsystem is given in Table 1. 
TABLE 1. SERIES-PARALLEL SUBSYSTEHS 
FAILURE RATES 
Subsystem A 
A 5xlO-4 
B 4xlO-4 
C lxlO-3 
D lxlO-3 
The analysts were to compute, for'time equal to 10 hours, the probability 
of complete failure of the total system and the system reliability. 
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DUAL-DUAL SYSTEM 
Figure 8 represents a partian af a digital flight cantral system which 
is dual-dual fail-aperating. The servo. amplifiers and manitar elements 
and servo. sets cannected to. the actual sensars are nat shawn to. keep the 
prablem within baunds. The sensars are crass-strapped to. twa-remate terminals 
which canvert the senSar signals to. digital signals which are tranmitted, o.n 
cammand,aver ane af the redundant busses far each remate terminal to. the flight 
cantral camputers. 
The principal functians to. be perf armed are the state estimatian 
functian and the cammand generatian/executian functian. Nate that a single 
r::ldar altimeter, attitude heading reference set, and inertial navigatian 
system are carried. Dual-digital air data systems, VOR/ILS receivers and 
DME receivers are carried and input to. bath remate terminals. Each remate terminal 
terminal has a dual redundant bus which interfaces with a bus interface unit 
that interfaces with the flight cantral camputer bus and hence flight cantral 
camputer. The dual redondant data bus also. interfaces with the remate terminal. 
In ather wards, aft remate terminal ane and sensar remate terminal ane have 
dual redundant busses 1A and lB and aft remate terminal twa and sensar remate 
terminal twa have busses 2A and 2B. Flight cantral made selectian is redundant 
and interfaces with each af the flight cantral computers thraugh a serial 
input/autput panel. 
Scenario. 
The miss ian cansists af three phases. The first phase is a takeaff/ 
climb phase and is fifteen minutes in duration. The secand phase is a cruise 
phase of farty-five minutes duratian. The descent and landing phase 
consists of fifteen minutes. Assume all equipment is operating at takeoff. 
During cruise, weather canditions at the scheduled destination develap requiring 
Categary II capability. As stated in FAA Advisary Circular 120-29, Categary II 
canditians require bath ILS and glide slape receivers to. be aperable, the 
radar altimeter to. be aperable, bath flight cantral camputers to be operable, 
as well as an attitude reference source such as the attitude heading reference 
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or inertial navigation system. Both digital air data systems must also be 
operable. Table a lists the components required for each of the mission phases. 
For the purpose of the analysis, the final approach and touchdown phase 
lasts for two minutes. 
Table 2 lists the equipment required for a safe flight, the equipment 
required to initiate the Category II landing at time equal to 73 minutes, and 
the equipment required to complete the Category II landing. The analysts 
calculated the probability of failure to initiate the landing and hence divert 
to the alternate airport due to loss of equipment required to initiate the 
landing, probability of successfully landing at the original destination, and 
probability of loss of the aircraft (unsafe flight) using the data in Figure 8 
and Table 2. 
At all times, each component is either totally operating or totally 
failed. The hardware and software associated with detecting component failures 
and removing failed elements is assumed to be perfectly accurate and perfectly 
reliable. Failures in each component have an exponential (Poisson) distribution. 
The Category II Approach and Landing can be aborted any time until T = 75 minutes. 
MULTI-PROCESSOR SYSTEM 
Scenario 
The scenario for the third problem involved a mission consisting of 
five flight phases which are given in Table 3 with the corresponding duration 6f 
each phase and probabilistic weather at the destination at the time of scheduled 
departure. 
The takeoff phase is assumed to start when the throttles are advanced 
to begin the takeoff roll after taking the active runway. The landing phase 
ends when the aircraft exits the active runway after decelerating to turnoff 
velocity. The weather at the destination is cloudy and the probability of the 
weather requiring Category II capability is 0.05 at the beginning of cruise. 
System Design 
The system configuration in Figure 9 represents a portion of a digital 
flight control system which possesses some of the features of the Fault Tolerant 
Multi-Processor (FTI1P) architecture developed by C. S. Draper Laboratories. 
.. J __ . J __ 1 
TABLE 2. COMPONENT REQUIREMENTS FOR MISSION PERFORMANCE LEVELS 
-y MINIMUM COMPONENT REQUIREMENTS 
Safe Flight Initiate CAT II Complete CAT II 
Component (both phases) Landing (T=13 min) Landing (T=15 min) 
Radar Alt. 1 
Digital Air Data {l 0: J 2 AHRS {lor 1) INS 
VOR 2 
DME 1 
Sensor RT 1 2 
PU-I 1 
PU-II 2 
FCMS 1 2 
Aft RT 1 2 
where 
PU processing unit 
PU-I: one FCC with one associated BIU 
PU-II: one FCC with both associated BIUs 
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TABLE 3. MISSION FLIGHT PROFILE 
Flight Phase Duration (minutes) 
l. Takeoff 3 
2. Climb-Out 8 
3. Cruise 51 
4. Let-Down 10 
5. Landing 3 
A quintuple redundant bus structure is employed with each of the 
five bus sets consisting of six lines. Two of the six lines in a bus set are 
dedicated to processor transmission (output) to common memory and registers; 
one line of the six is dedicated to common memory transmissions (output); 
one of the six is dedicated to clock generator transmission; one of the six is 
dedicated to I/O port input transmissions; and the last of the six is dedicated 
to I/O port output transmissions. 
Each processor contains an independent processor-cache memory 
module, and common memory modules which communicate with other processors via 
the redundant serial busses. All information processing and transmission is 
conducted in triplicate by a triad of processors so that local voters in 
each module can detect errors. Each processor triad acts as one functional 
processor, of which several can work in parallel. The core software is assumed 
to handle fault detection, diagnosis, and recovery in such a way that appli-
cations programs do not need to be involved. 
The procedures of each job reside in common memory. Each job step 
is scheduled to occur at a given time or following a given event. Relevant 
dispatch data for each scheduled job step is kept in a queue. Job assignments 
are all made on a floating basis, so that any available processor triad is 
eligible to execute any job step. When a processor fails, its triad will 
attempt to complete its current job step, which it will do unless a second 
failure occurs during the milliseconds required to complete the job step. 
When the job step is complete, one of the other processor triads is assigned 
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the task of controlling the reconfiguration of the "injured" triad. Modules 
can be retired and/or reassigned in any configuration. Reconfiguration 
is carried out routinely from second to second to search for latent faults 
in the voting and reconfiguration elements. 
The functions (and their priority) and subfunctions (tasks) to be 
performed are given in Table 4. The priority of the tasks (and associated job 
steps) is used by the processor triads in their selection (from common memory) 
of the next job step to be executed. For the purpose of this problem, only 
the functions' priority was considered. The functions' priority and criticality 
correspond to those given in Table 5. 
The sensors interfacing with the sensor remote terminal, and servo 
amplifiers, monitor elements, and servo sets (connected to the actual actuators) 
interfacing with the actuators remote terminal were not considered to keep 
the problem within bounds. In working this problem, it was assumed that: 
(1) All processors, remote terminals, and the MIL-STD-1553A 
bus interface are properly functioning at the beginning 
of the take-off phase, t = O. 
(2) Only permanent failures need be considered; that is, 
each component is either totally failed or totally 
operating. 
(3) All components are nominally required to function 
during the entire flight. 
(4) Fault detection and reconfiguration are assumed to be 
perfectly accurate and no second failures occur during 
reconfiguration (Admittedly, this is a bad assumption 
since a finite amount of time is required for recon-
figuration but the problem analysis objective does not 
suffer from this assumption). 
(5) All bus sets and the MIL-STD-l553A dual bus (itself) 
are perfectly reliable. 
(6) The Flight Management function is required from t = 0 to 
t = 72, i.e. for Phases 1-4 in order to arrive on time. 
(7) The remote terminals and the HIL-STD-1553A bus interface 
with the MIL-STD-1553A busses have redundant input/output 
(I/O) channels A and B with equal reliability. In order 
for data transfer and hence safe flight to be successful, 
the conditions in Table 6 must be satisfied. In other 
words, a sensor-to-bus interface and a bus interface to 
actuator channel must exist for data transfer and hence 
safe flight. 
Priority 
3 
2 
1 
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TABLE 4. AUTOMATIC FLIGHT FUNCTIONS 
Function 
Flight Augmentation Control 
Flight Control 
Flight Management 
Subfunction 
1. Artificial Feel 
2. Pitch Trim 
3. Stability Augmentation 
a. Mach/IAS Augmentation 
b. Pitch Augmentation 
c. Wing-Load Alleviation 
Augmentation 
d. Flutter Suppression 
Augmentation 
e. Ride Control Augmentation 
f. Roll Augmentation 
g. Yaw Augmentation 
4. Rudder Ratio Changer 
5. Direct Lift Control 
6. Aileron Gain Programming 
7. Flap Limiting 
Attitude Hold 
HeadIng Hold 
Control ~~eel Steering 
Altitude Hold 
Automatic Approach and Landing 
Autothrottle 
Air Speed Select 
Air Speed Hold 
Missed Approach 
Back Course Localizer 
Flight Director Signals 
Heading Select 
Course Select 
Flight Envelope Protection 
Performance ~':anagement 
Lateral Navigation and Guidance 
Heading Select/Hold 
Course Select/Hold 
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TABLE 4. (Continued) 
Priority 
1 
Function 
Flight Management 
(continued) 
Subfunction 
Vertical Navigation and Guidance 
Vertical Speed Select/Hold 
Altitude Select/Hold 
Thrust Axis Control 
Airspeed/Hach Hold 
Airspeed/Mach Select 
4-D Guidance 
Electronic Flight Instrument 
System Management 
Data Update Interface 
Inertial Reference System 
Initialization and Heading Set 
TABLE 5. FUNCTION PRIORITY/CRITICALITY 
Function Priority 
Flight Augmentation 3 
Flight Control 2 
Flight r~anagement 1 
Criticality 
Required for Safe Flight. As failures 
occur, it is always given priority over 
Flight Control and :-1anagement. After 
spares are depleted, assume loss of one 
processor results in loss of the air-
craft. 
Required to initiate and complete 
CATEGORY II or III approach and landing. 
Loss results in reduced operative per-
formance and increases pilot \-.7orkload. 
It is given priority over Flight Manage-
ment. Not required for dispatch unless 
adverse weather expected during flight. 
Required for energy efficient and on-
time flight. Loss results in flying 
radials between VORTACS and extends 
flying time. Not required for dispatch. 
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TABLE 6. MIL-STD-1553A DATA TRANSFER LOGIC 
MIL-STD-1553A 
Sensor Bus Interface Actuator Safe 
Channel Channel Channel Flight 
A B A B A B -, ! 
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(8) Each triad performs a single function as shown in 
Table 7. With less than three processors out of ten 
functioning, the aircraft is assumed to crash. ' 
(9) The subsystems permanent failure rates are constant 
(exponential model). The reciprocals of the failure 
rates (MTBF) are given in Table 8. 
The analysts computed the following mission outcomes: 
(1) Probability of successful on-time landing at the original 
destination. 
(2) Probability of successful, but late, (based on flight 
management loss prior to landing phase) landing at 
the original destination and the expected economic 
penalty for inefficient flight (see Table 9). 
(3) Probability of diverting and safely landing at the 
alternate destination. Diversion only occurs during 
phases 3, 4, and 5 if CAT II capability is required 
and not available. The expected economic penalty was 
computed using Table 9 data. It was assumed that the 
flight time to the alternate is the same as the remaining 
flight time to the original destination. 
(4) Probability of aborting (due to loss of all spares 
with only a triad remaining and safely landing at 
the origin during phases 1 and 2. It was assumed that 
abort at end of phase 1 transitions to phase 5 (with 
VFR); abort at end of phase 2 transitions to phase 4 
followed by phase 5 (with VFR). 
(5) Probability of loss of aircraft during the mission; and, 
probability of loss of aircraft during each phase. 
MULTI-PROCESSOR DESIGN MODIFIED 
FOR CROSS-TRAINING 
The system design used for the cross-training of the analysts on 
the respective fault tree and "performability analysis" methods was a variation 
of the multi-processor design previously analyzed. For this case, the same 
design applies but the reliability of the remote terminals and bus interface 
units was assumed to be perfect. Only the reliability of the ten processors 
was considered. 
TABLE 7. PROCESSORS REQUIRED FOR FLIGHT FUNCTIONS 
-,------
Processors Triads Flight Functions Operating 
Functioning Failed 
.-.-- .. --
Spare Augmentation Control Mal~elllent 
10 0 1 3 Y Y Y 
9 1 0 3 Y Y Y 
8 2 2 2 Y Y N 
7 3 1. 2 Y Y N 
() 
'. 0 2 Y Y N 
5 5 2 1 Y N N 
'. 6 1. 1 Y N N 
3 7 0 1 Y N N 
2 8 0 0 N LanJ Immediately 
I 9 0 0 N Crash 
() 10 0 0 Crash 
-------~.---- ---------
-------. 
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TABLE 8. SUBSYSTEM DATA 
Subsystem MTBF (Hours) 
Processor 100 
Bus Interface Channel A 500 
Bus Interface Channel B 500 
Remote Terminals Channel A 500 
Remote Terminals Channel B 500 
.TABLE 9. ECONOMICS PENALTIES DATA 
1. Inefficient Flight (i.e., Loss of Flight Management [F11]) 
D1 I-
D2 - -1-
» D3 - - -~ 
r-I 
ttl 
c:: 
ill D4 - - --p... I .(J)-
1 2 3 4 
Phases 
Loss of FH during phase j (but not prior to phase j) causes an economic 
penalty of $D .• 
J 
2. Diversion and Safe Flight 
D = $ penalty S 
Assume DS > 10. D1 
3. Abort and Safe Return to Point of Origination 
D6 = $ Penalty 
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The same scenarios used for the multi-processor problem was used in 
the cross-training problem. The analysts were instructed to compute the 
probability of safe on-time arrival at the original destination. If time and 
funds permitted, the analysts were also allowed to compute the probability 
of successful late landing at the original destination, probability of 
diversion with a safe landing, and the probability of loss of the aircraft. 
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ANALYSIS RESULTS 
SERIES-PARALLEL PROBLEM 
The series-parallel problem was an elementary problem used primarily 
for learning purposes by the analysts concerned with fault trees and performa-
bility analysis. Solutions using those two techniques were quickly and easily 
obtained; they were numerically equal. One man-hour was expended for performa-
bility analysis and one and one-half man-hours were used for the fault-tree 
analysis. 
The TASRA solution was also quickly obtained, but it was not equiva-
lent to the other two solutions. A model error which had the net effect of 
interchanging failure rates among components was located. Following correction 
of the error, the TASRA results agreed with the other results. One man-hour 
and nine system seconds of computer time were expended on the TASRA analysis 
and documentation. 
DUAL-DUAL SYSTEM ANALYSIS 
Summary of Results 
Table 10 summarizes the results of applying the three analysis tech-
niques to the previously described dual-dual system. Numerical results for 
performabi1ity analysis and the fault-tree approach are in close agreement. 
The TASRA values exhibit some disparities compared to the other values. The 
differences apparently are caused by the procedure used to combine components 
into subsystems and then the system, since it assumes the aggregated entities 
will have exponential failure distributions. The man-hour figures are for 
problem formulation and solution; they do not include time to check the results 
to resolve numerical differences between techniques. 
A summary of the performability analysis solution is given in the 
next subsection. Details are provided in Appendix A. The fault-tree analysis 
follows the performability solution. The TASRA solution is then described. 
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TABLE 10. DUAL-DUAL SYSTEM ANALYSIS RESULTS 
FOR THE THREE TECHNIQUES 
Performability Fault Trees 
Mission Outcome Probabilities 
Safe Flight and Landing at 0.974212 0.974245 
Primary Destination 
Safe Flight and Landing at 0.025763 0.025701 
Alternate Destination 
Loss of Aircraft 25.98xlO -6 25.98xlO -6 
Man-Hours for Solution 46 30 
TASRA 
0.974236 
0.025740 
23.69xlO -6 
25 
~ 
I 
,.... 
! 
r 
;-
I 
t 
r 
I 
,r 
,-
i' 
t 
r 
I 
! ' 
,..... 
I 
~ 
I 
! 
i ' 
i 
37 
Performability Analysis Solution 
Analytic Summary 
The performability analysis solution of the dual-dual system problem 
used three model levels--mission, function, and component--in addition to the 
accomplishment set. A concept of "independence with respect to mission out-
comes" was used to accommodate the large number of trajectories in the base 
(i.e., component level) model. Probability computations were performed using 
the matrix multiplication procedures of performability analysis. The following 
paragraphs summarize the models and computations used to analyze the dual-dual 
system; details are provided in Appendix A. 
The accomplishment set is A = {aO' aI' a2} where the a i represent 
specific mission outcomes (i.e., accomplishment levels) of interest. In 
particular, 
represents safe flight and successful landing at 
the primary destination/ 
represents safe flight and successful landing at 
the alternate destination; 
represents loss of the aircraft (unsafe flight or 
unsuccessful landing). 
The base model is defined in terms of thirteen component types used 
in the dual-dual system and is also called the component level, or level 2, 
model. Two phases of the mission are used. Phase 1 is the time from takeoff 
(t = 9 minutes) to initiation of landing (t = 73 minutes). Phase 2 is the 
time from initiation of landing (t = 73 minutes) to completion of landing 
(t = 75 minutes). The specific variables used are x .. , the number of units of 
1J 
component type i (i = 1,2, ..• ,13) which are fault-free for phase j (j = 1,2). 
Each base model trajectory is represented by a 13-by-2 matrix in which rows 
correspond to component types and columns correspond to phases. Each such 
trajectory corresponds to a single accomplishment level. 
As described in the synopsis of performability analysis, the first 
step is to determine the set of base model trajectories which results in the 
mission outcome a. for every a. in A. 
1 1 
Two model levels--mission and function--
were used to form the logical connection between the base model and the 
accomplishment set. 
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The mission level (level 0) model consists of two binary variables 
hI and h2' representing the conditions required for "no diversion" and for 
"safe flight", respectively. Each mission level trajectory is of the form 
[~~] . The set of mission level trajectories corresponding to each ai and A 
was determined directly from the definitions of the a i and of hl and h 2 . 
These inverses are: 
-1 [11 
YO (aO) I! J 
-1 (al ) 
[01 Yo 11 J 
-1 (a ) = [~] YO 2 
where * indicates "any possible value" (in this case, 0 or 1). 
The function level (level 1) model consists of four variables 
(f., i = 1, 2, 3, 4), one for each function. A function is defined as the set 
1 
of jobs performed by a group of components. Groups are comprised of components 
which are related in some way. For example, the digital air data, attitude 
heading reference system, and inertial navigation system have interacting roles 
during the mission. Each function variable is defined as follows: 
f. = 
1 
2 if function i meets the "no diversion" and 
"safe flight" requirements; 
1 if function i meets the "safe flight" but not 
the "no diversion" requirements; 
o otherwise. 
A function level trajectory is then a column vector of the form 
The inverse image of each mission level trajectory in the function level 
trajectory space was determined using the process described in the synopsis 
of performability analysis. Details are given in Appendix A. The function 
level inverses of the accomplishment levels are shown in Table 11. 
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TABLE 11. FUNCTION LEVEL INVERSES OF THE 
ACCOMPLISHMENT LEVELS 
Accomplishment Level, a. 
~ 
ao (safe, no diversion) 
al (safe, diversion) 
a2 (unsafe) 
-1 Function Level Inverses, y 1 (ai ) 
"*" represents "any possible value" (i.e., 0, 1 or 2) 
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The process of determining all base model trajectories which map to 
a given function level trajectory (i.e., the inverse image of the function 
level trajectory) is detailed in Appendix A. Basically, the approach is to 
find the inverse image for each component of the function level trajectory 
and then form the intersection of those images. 
A practical problem encountered at this point was the large number 
(4 x 1010) of mathematically possible base level trajectories. Every such 
trajectory must appear exactly once in the complete group of inverse image 
sets. Some method of writing many matrices in a reasonable amount of time 
* was needed. Use of Cartesian sets allows for efficient representation of 
sets. Notational conveniences such as using "*" to represent "any possible 
v'l.lue" provide some limited help. Use of these approaches would still leave 
a burdensome task. The approach which relieves the burden is to take advantage 
of the mutual independence of groups of components. For example, the effect 
of the processors and bus interface units on the mission outcome is independent 
of the effect of the radar altimeter, VOR, and DME. 
The concept of independence with respect to mission outcomes was used 
to divide the thirteen component types into four groups, each of whose trajec-
tories were individually analyzed. The functions used in the previous model 
were chosen to correspond exactly with the independent component groups of the 
base model. A separate state diagram was then created for each component group. 
Probability computations, the second step of performability analysis, 
were made using the four component groups. For each group, the computational 
procedure used the intraphase transition matrices, characteristic matrices, and 
vectors as described in the synopsis of the technique and References 1, 2, 3, 
and 9. The mission outcome probabilities for the four component groups were 
then combined in a straightforward way to determine the probability of each 
accomplishment level. An HP-25 hand calculator with eleven significant digits 
was used for the computations. The performability analysis results are: 
* 
Pr (safe flight and no diversion) = 0.974212 
Pr (safe flight and diversion) 
Pr (aircraft is lost) 
0.025763 
= 25.98xlO-6 
A set V is Cartesian if V = Rl x R2 x ••• x ~ where Ri represents the set 
of all projections of elements of V onto their ith coordinates. 
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Solution Effort 
Application of performability analysis to the dual-dual system 
required a total of 46 man-hours. Of this total, 38 man-hours were used to 
formulate the model hierarchy, determine the inverse images (y-l (a.)) of the 
~ 
accomplishment levels, and perform the probability computations. Another 
8 man-hours were used to check the probability computations. Because of 
numerical discrepancies among the three techniques, the entire solution was 
then checked with an expenditure of 18 man-hours. 
Discussion 
Several difficulties were encountered in this application of performa-
bility analysis. The first significant problem was defining the model hierarchy. 
Both the accomplishment set and the base level model were readily defined using 
the problem statement. However, it was not clear how to define intermediate 
models to logically connect these two views of the system. 
The large number of distinct component types (13 in the base model) 
result in over 1010 mathematically possible trajectories. Some method of 
decomposing this large state set was obviously needed. This was the motivation 
for dividing the base model into four component groups which were mutually 
independent with respect to their effects on the mission outcome. These groups 
provided the basis for defining four "functions" and the function level model. 
The mission level model, which lies between the function level and 
the accomplishment set, was straightforward to define and use. While the 
mission level model could have been omitted from this problem, its use provides 
a better representation of performability analysis. 
One conceptual error was made in determining groups of components 
which were independent with respect to their effects on the mission outcome • 
The error was an oversight regarding a dependency involving five components 
from two different groups and a landing requiring Category II weather capa-
bility. As shown in Appendix A, the probability of the event representing the 
error is on the order of 10-14 • Since the error was quite small, the proba-
bility computations were not changed. 
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It should be noted that the error was not a result of the performa-
bility analysis technique. The error can be attributed to the complexity of 
the problem and the analyst's attempts to decompose it into manageable pieces. 
A supplementary analysis using the five components was performed to satisfy 
the analyst that the problem could have been formulated in a manner to capture 
the dependency. The associated state diagram involved 72 states. The associ-
ated state transition matrix would have been tedious to complete and use, 
but it would not have required any ingenuity on the part of the user. 
Fault Tree Solution 
Analytic Summary 
In this problem, three different probabilities are required. Accord-
ingly, three different fault trees must be prepared. 
Loss of Aircraft Control. The fault tree for loss of control is 
shown in Figure 10. 
Failure to Initiate Cat II Landing. The fault tree for this case is 
shown in Figure 11. 
Treatment of the Landing Phase. The landing phase differs from the 
earlier phase in that the operating complement of equipment is not uniquely 
defined at the start. In order to initiate the Cat II landing, all components 
must be operating with the following exceptions: (a) either one or two DME 
receivers, (b) either the AHRS, the INS, or both. Since the DME receiver is 
not involved in the landing phase, the question of whether one or both were 
operating at the start does not affect landing probabilities. Heading 
reference is needed during the landing, however, and the probability of 
completing the landing will definitely depend on which of the attitude equip-
ments are operating at the start of the landing. 
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The following definitions will be used to develop the computational 
E2 = successful initiation of Cat II landing 
Ef = successful completion of Cat II landing 
EAI = both AHRS and INS operating at landing initiation 
EA = AHRS operating at landing initiation, but INS has failed 
INS operating at landing initiation, but AHRS has failed 
meeting all the non-heading requirements for landing 
initiation. 
The principal task is, of course, to compute the probability of a successful 
landing (i.e., to determine Pr[Ef ]). There are three and only three starting 
conditions for the landing: (1) ER and EAI , (2) ER and EA, and (3) ER and EI . 
It follows that 
Pr[Ef ] = Pr[ER and EAI]Pr[EfIER and EAI ] 
+ Pr[ER and EA]Pr[EfIER and EA] 
+ Pr[ER and EI]Pr[EfIER and EI ] 
Since ER and EAI are associated with different equipment, they are independent 
events. It follows that 
Similar arguments can be made for the other two terms so that 
Pr[Ef ] = pr[ER]{Pr[EAI]Pr[EfIER and EAI ] 
+ Pr[EA]Pr[Ef\ER and EA] 
It can be seen from Figure 2 that Pr[ER] = 0.974299. Also: 
-73 -73 
Pr[EAI ] = eXP{60x800}exP{60x300}= 0.994438 
-73 -73 -3 
= eXP{60x800}[1-exp{60x300}]= 4.04ll5xlO 
-73 -73 -3 
= [1-exp{60x800}]exp{60x300}= 1.51353xlO 
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The conditional failure probabilities are developed in Figures 12, 13, and 14. 
Substituting the results into the above equation for Pr[Efl, 
Pr[Efl = 0.974299{0.994438 (1-4.76372xlO-5) 
+4.04ll5xlO-3 (1-8.92986xlO-5) 
+1.5l353xlO-3 (1-15.8738xlO-5)} 
= 0.974299{0.994391 + 4.04079xlO-3 + 1.5l329xlO-3} 
= 0.974245 
Solution Effort 
Determination of the time required for this problem is somewhat 
difficult because the problem went through some re-definition after it was 
initially stated. In addition, some time was lost in the solution by an 
erroneous interpretation of the problem statement which was finally developed. 
It is estimated that some 30 hours would have been required had these problems 
not been present. Actually, some 45 hours were spent on all activities 
associated with this problem. 
TASRA Solution 
Analytic Summary 
Figure 15 depicts the reliability block diagram of the dual-dual 
system used for constructing TASRA inputs. Each assembly was given a set of 
identifying numbers to uniquely reference its possible states. For example, 
assembly 20 was the sensor terminals. The numbers 20.0, 20.1, and 20.2 refer 
to the states "both sensor terminals fault free", "both terminals failed", and 
"one terminal failed", respectively. Except for the fundamental assemblies, 
each assembly consists of a number of subassemblies. A logic table was created 
for each such assembly to specify the assembly state resulting from each 
possible combination of subassembly states. Finally, the failure rate data 
were input. 
Two runs of TASRA were used to derive the numerical results. -The 
first run corresponded to the first phase (i.e., takeoff to initiate landing). 
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The second run corresponded to the landing phase. This breakdown was necessary 
to model the various states the system could occupy at the transition between 
the two phases. The results of the two runs were manually combined to derive 
the following results: 
Pr (safe flight and Cat II landing) = 0.974236 
Pr (safe flight and diversion) 
Pr (loss of aircraft) 
Solution Effort 
= 0.025740 
23.69x10-6 
The man-hours required to perform the TASRA analysis were estimated 
to be 25 hours. The actual time was somewhat greater, but it included effort 
spent resolving computer difficulties due to a system upgrade and interpreting 
the problem statement. In addition, 128 system seconds of computer time (on a 
CDC 6500) were used. This included creation and manipulation of input files 
and production of full TASRA documentation. 
Discussion 
TASRA was not designed to model multi-phase mission problems. It was 
therefore necessary to manually combine results for the different phases. This 
involved conditional probabilities. Some conceptual difficulty was encountered 
in ensuring the probabilities were correctly combined. 
A considerable portion of the solution effort was devoted to the 
input logic tables. Every mathematically possible combination of subassembly 
states had to be evaluated for its effect on the assembly state. This task 
required detailed knowledge of the dual-dual system. 
In addition to mission outcome probabilities, TASRA provided output 
on the unreliability "drivers". Also, additional computer runs to test vari-
ations of the system could be made using few man-hours. 
Some of the numerical differences between TASRA and the other 
techniques can be attributed to the procedure used to combine subassemblY 
probabilities into assembly probabilities. Each subassembly failure distri-
bution is assumed to be exponential. TASRA assumes the assembly probabilities 
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are also from exponential distributions. The errors associated with this 
assumption are typically quite small. However, since the dual-dual problem 
involves small probabilities, the relative error may be significant. 
MULTI-PROCESSOR SYSTEM ANALYSIS 
Summary of Results 
Table 12 summarizes the results of applying performability analysis 
and fault trees to the previously described multi-processor system. The 
performability analysis solution is described in the next subsection and is 
followed by the fault tree solution. 
Analytic Summary 
Performability Analysis of the 
Multi-Processor Problem 
Five specific outcomes were required by the problem statement. 
These outcomes defined the accomplishment set: 
where the mission outcome characteristics associated with each accomplishment 
level are: 
ao - safe, on time, original destination; 
al - safe, late, original destination; 
a2 - safe, diverted to alternate destination; 
a3 - safe, aborted to point of origin; 
a4 - unsafe. 
The mission (level 0) model used four binary variables to express 
the mission outcomes. The variables were as follows: 
M = {o if the flight is not aborted 
1 1 otherwise 
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TABLE 12. MULTI-PROCESSOR SYSTEM RESULTS FOR PERFORMABILITY 
ANALYSIS AND FAULT TREES 
Quantities* 
P (safe, on-time, original destination) 
P (safe, late, original destination) 
E (penalty for late arrival) 
P (safe, diversion) 
E (penalty for diversion) 
P (safe, aborted flight) 
E (penalty for aborting) 
P (aircraft lost, phase 1) 
P (aircraft lost, phase 2) 
P (aircraft lost, phase 3) 
P (aircraft lost, phase 4) 
P (aircraft lost, phase 5) 
P (aircraft lost) 
E (all penalties) 
Man-hours for solution 
Performability 
0.99394882 
0.00600770 
$53.3502 
3.5xlO-9 
$00.0007 
o 
o 
-9 70.0xlO 
869.0xlO-9 
28.8080xlO-6 
10.3387xlO-6 
3.3978xlO-6 
43.4835xlO-6 
$53.3509 
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* P indicates probability and E indicates expected value. 
Fault Trees 
0.99394863 
0.00600766 
$53.3525 
l4.0xlO-9 
$00.0028 
o 
o 
69.99xlO-9 
870.4xlO-9 
28.8957xlO:6 
10.3873xlO-6 
3. 292lxlO-6 
43.5l55xlO-6 
$53.3553 
22 
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MZ \~ if the flight is not diverted' = otherwise 
M3 {~ if the flight is on time = otherwise 
M = {o if the flight is safe 4 1 otherwise. 
The level 0 trajectory space was the set of four dimensional vectors: 
Ml 
Uo 
MZ 1M. 0, 1 = 
M3 ~ 
M4 
o -1 The subsets of U corresponding to each accomplishment level, denoted y (a.), 
o ~ 
were determined by inspection. They are shown in Table 13, where "~:" 
represents "any possible value". 
The function (level 1) model was based on characteristics of the 
mUlti-processor system and the specified criteria for aborting, diverting, late 
arrival, and safe flight. The criteria involved the number of fault-free 
processor triads and fault-free spare processors available during specific 
phases of the flight. A communication channel (i.e., an appropriate combina-
tion of sensor remote terminals, but interface units, and actuator remote 
terminals as specified in the problem statement) is required for safe flight. 
In addition, the existence of Category II weather was included since it impacts 
the need to divert. The function level variables were defined as follows: 
F1J number of failed triads at the end of phase j 
FZj = number of spare processors at the end of phase;j 
if a communication channel exists at the end of phase j 
otherwise 
if the weather at the original destination is not 
Category II 
otherwise 
The weather variable, F4 , is not phase dependent since weather information 
becomes known in phase 3 and does not subsequently change. In the matrices 
describing level 1 trajectories, the value of F4 was indicated in Column 3. 
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TABLE 13. LEVEL 0 TRAJECTORY SETS FOR THE 
ACCOMPLISHMENT LEVELS 
Accomplishment Levels 
al a 2 a3 
a 0 a 1 
a a 1 
* 
0 1 
* * 
0 a a a 
* 
* 
* 
1 
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The other columns were filled with asterisks to indicate the lack of restric-
tions. The variables F1j and FZj are closely related since the ten processors 
are dynamically reconfigured to form as many fault-free triads as possible. 
Five phases were defined in the problem statement. The level 1 trajectory 
space was 
::e = f{r::}nj set of matrices: 
The next step was to determine the subsets of U1 which corresponded 
to each accomplishment level. This was done by finding the matrices in Ul 
corresponding to the level 0 trajectories for each accomplishment level. The 
following procedure was used. First, each M. (level 0 variable) was considered 
~ 
individually. The level 1 matrices which result in a given value for each M1 
were determined. For example, consider M1 = 0, which indicates "no abort". 
The flight is aborted if and only if one triad and no spares are available 
prior to the end of phase 2. The status of the communication channels and the 
weather have no bearing on the abort criteria. Table 14 shows the level 1 
trajectories corresponding to M1 = O. Asterisks, which represent "any possible 
value", and entries such as "0 or 1" were used to reduce the number of matrices. 
Next, the level of trajectories were considered for each accomplishment level. 
For a given level 0 trajectory, the level 1 matrices for each M. value were 
~ 
known. The corresponding level 1 matrices were constructed by forming all 
possible intersections using one matrix for each of the four M. values. These 
~ 
sets of matrices were the level 1 inverses of the accomplishment levels and 
-1 
were denoted Y1 (ai )· 
The base (level 2) model was defined in terms of the system compo-
nents. One variable, N., was used to denote the number of processors which 
J 
are failed by the end of phase j. Nj had integer values from zero to ten. A 
second variable, C., was set to zero if a communication channel exists at the 
J 
end of phase j, and to one otherwise. Figure 16 displays the state diagram 
for the base model. Nine states of interest are identified. For convenience, 
the state numbers shown in the diagram were used to represent the state of the 
system. A base model trajectory was then represented as a vector of five state 
numbers, one for the end of each phase. 
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TABLE 14. LEVEL 
M = 1 0 
0 or 1 
* 
* 
* 
0 or 1 
* 
* 
* 
2 
1 or 2 
* 
* 
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1 TRAJECTORIES CORRESPONDING TO 
("no abort") 
0 or 1 
* * * 
* * * * 
* * * * 
* * * * 
2 
* * * 
1 or 2 
* * * 
* * * * 
* * * * 
2 
* * * 
1 or 2 
* * * 
* * * * 
* * * * 
o failed 
triads 
1 failed 
triads 
2 failed 
triads 
1 
FIGURE 16. 
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Base model trajectories for each level 1 trajectory were constructed 
directly from the ~ijJ matrices. The first two rows of the matrices (number 
of failed triads and number of spare processors) correspond to the base model 
variable N .• The third row of the matrix is equivalent to C .• The fourth row 
J J 
only contained one variable (Category II weather), which was used in the proba-
bility computations. Grouping the base model trajectories corresponding to the 
level 1 trajectories for a given a. (i.e., yl -
l
, (a.)) resulted in the set of 
~ ~ -1 
base model trajectories for 
. d the y-l construct~on cause 
summarized in Table 15. 
the outcome a., denoted Y (a.). The method of 
~ ~ 
(a.) trajectory sets to be Cartesian. They are 
~ 
The probability computations were performed using the basic proba-
bIlity equation shown in the synopsis of performability analysis. Table 16 
displays the numerical results. 
Solution Effort 
A total of 59 man-hours were expended in th~ performability analysis 
solution of the multi-processor problem. The breakdown of man-hours by 
solution steps is: 
Problem understanding, modeling development 
Trajectory set computations 
Probability computation 
TOTAL 
18 
20 
21 
59 
An additional 19 man-hours were expended on detailed computation checks to 
resolve differences with the fault-tree results. No significant errors were 
identified. 
Discussion 
Solution of the multi-processor problem using performability analysis 
required little ingenuity and substantial perseverance. It was, of course, 
necessary to have a good understanding of the multi-processor system and its 
mission requirements. 
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TABLE 15. BASE MODEL TRAJECTORY SETS FOR 
EACH ACCOMPLISHMENT LEVEL 
Set Symbol Set Trajectories 
---
-1 {I, 2} x {I, 2} x {I, 2} x li, 2} x li, S} Y (a O) ... , 
li, 2} x li, 2} x li, 2} x li, 2} x {6, 7, 8} . 
-1 li, S} x li, S} x li, 8} x {3, .•• , 8} x {3, ••• , 8} Y (a1) · .. , · .. , · .. , 
{I, · .. , S} x li, · .. , S} x li, · .. , S} x {3, 4, S} x {3, 4, S} 
{I, · .. , nx {6, n x {6, 7, 8} x {6, 7, 8} x {6, 7, 8} 
--
-I {I, S} x li, S} x li, S} x li, 8} x {6, 7, 8} Y (a2) · .. , · .. , · .. , ... , 
li, · .. , S} x li, · .. , S} x {6, 7, 8} x {6, 7, 8} x {6, 7, 8} 
li, · .. , S} x {6, n x {6, 7, 8} x {6, 7, 8} x {6, 7, 8} 
-1 {8} S S {8} y (a3) x x x S x 
li, 7}x {8} x S {8} x {8} .-" · .. , x 
-1 {9} Q. Q Q Q y (a4) x x x x 
li, · .. , 8} x {9} x Q x Q x Q 
\ 
li, · .. , 8} x {I, · .. , 8} x {9} x Q x Q 
li, · .. , 8} x li, · .. , 8} x li, · .. , 8} x {9} x Q 
li, · .. , 8} x li, · .. , 8} x li, · .. , 8} x li, ... , 8} x {9} 
where S indicates skipped phase 
Q = li, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9} 
r, 
i-
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TABLE 16. PROBABILITY (Pr) AND EXPECTED VALUE (E) 
RESULTS FOR PERFORMABILITY ANALYSIS 
OF THE MULTI-PROCESSOR PROBLEM 
62 
The models used in the model hierarchy were not difficult to define. 
The mission (level 0) and base (level 2) models were defined directly from the 
problem statement. Some latitude existed in selection of the function (level 1) 
model. In addition to the selected function model, options included using no 
function model, using only one phase (i.e., the entire mission), and treating 
the communication channels separately from the processors. The last option 
was based on the observation that the system could achieve any accomplishment 
level as long as a communication channel exists, while lack of a communication 
channel would result in loss of the aircraft. Separate treatment of the 
communication channels would have required less time but was not done in order 
to more accurately represent performability analysis. 
Construction of the trajectory inverses from the mission model to 
the function model and then to the base model was conceptually straightforward 
but mechanically tedious. A simple procedure for naming the matrices 
(Reference 6) was useful for bookkeeping purposes. The time spent on the 
trajectories was divided about equally between computing the trajectories and 
checking the computations. At each model level, all mathematically possible 
trajectories were represented. A counting argument was used to check that the 
correct number of trajectories had been listed. Additional checks were made 
to ensure that no trajectories had been omitted or listed twice. These checks 
resulted in a high level of confidence that the base model accurately repre-
sented the problem. 
The probability computations were conceptually easy, mechanical, and 
somewhat time consuming. Individual state transition probabilities were 
computed using the component failure rates and phase durations. The matrix 
multiplications consumed most of the time spent on probability computations. 
They could have been done in less time with METAPHOR (Reference 7), a computer 
program written for performability analysis computations. Also, METAPHOR 
would have significantly reduced the time spent checking the computations. 
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Fault Tree Method Solution 
Analytic Summary 
There are a number of different results required in this problem. 
Generally a different fault tree is required for each of the desired answers. 
There is some overlap in the computations required, but a distinct fault tree 
is necessary in each case. 
Safe, On-Time Landing. The approach here will be to compute the 
complement of the desired probability (i.e., the probability of failure to 
arrive safely and on time. The fault tree with this as the top event is shown 
in Figure 17. The probabilities of the top event and the probabilities of the 
various contributing events are shown. 
The probabilities of the individual events can be computed as follows. 
First, the probability of loss of flight management will be considered. This 
will be caused by a loss of two or more processors prior to the end of phase 4. 
The probability of this is 
P = 1_(1_p)10_10p(1_p)9 
1 
(Eq. 1) 
where p is the probability of loss of a single processor in a period of 72 
minutes. The probability p is given by 
-72 
P = l-exP{60xlOO}= 0.0119283 (Eq. 2) 
Substituting this value in Equation 1 gives PI = 0.0060078497. 
Next, it is necessary to establish P2 , the probability of loss of 
control during phase 5, given that flight management was intact at the end of 
phase 4. If, at the end of phase 4, 10 processors are operating, loss of 
control would require loss of five or more processors in three minutes. The 
probability of exactly five failures is 36p5(1_p)5, where p is the probability 
of loss of a single processor in three minutes. This is of the order of 
-4 -17 5 x 10 ,which gives a probability of loss of the order of 10 ,which is 
trivial compared to Pl' 
It remains to determine P3 , the probability of loss of bus communi-
cation. This event is the top event of another fault tree, shown in Figure 18. 
J _ ',J -, _' J 
0.0060078497 
Loss of flight 
mgt., Phases 1-4 
Failure to complete 
safe, on-time landing 
6.0513652 x10-3 
bR 
r, 
0.0 
Loss of control, 
Phase 5 
FIGURE 17. FAULT TREE FOR COMPLEMENT OF 
SAFE, ON-TIME LANDING 
I _ J ,f I ,I J ", .. 
4.35155x10-5 
Loss of bus 
communication, 
Phases 1-5 
, J ) ,I 
0\ 
~ 
) 
,I 
- I -- -J '--"1 -----, -----'r -----'1 -----1 _ I . . t . ~- -:1 '.I . --] .'- -.1 -'_---1 ---:, "'~l ... -) 
Loss of Bus 
Communication, 
Phases 1-5 
4.35155)(10 -5 
l 
.---______ 1 
6.23441)(10 -6 
-----
-6 6.23441 x 10 
i 
6.23441x 10-6 
Both sensors lost Both BIU's lost 
,.,. 00;;;""" I lost 
o 
Sensor A Sensor B BIU A BIU B Actuator A 
fails -3 fails -3 fails 
2.49688xlO 2.49688xlO 2.49688_3 
xlO 
fails fails -3 
2.49688_3 2.49688xlO 
x 10 
p=l - exp {- 607~ 500} - 2.49688X10-3 
Actuator B 
fails 
2.49688)(10-3 
·12.4688X10-6 
Sensor to nLU 
communication 
lost 
FIGURE 18. FAULT TREE FOR LOSS OF BUS COMMUNICATION 
l2.4066XlO-6 
BIU to aCtuator 
communication 
lost 
~ 
\.J1 
-) 
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The first three contributing events can be treated in straightforward fashion. 
The loss of communication is somewhat more complex. Loss of Sensor to BIU 
communication can come about in two ways. Using Y to indicate fault-free 
operation and N to indicate failure, the two ways are depicted as follows: 
Sensor A 
Y 
N 
Sensor B 
N 
Y 
BID A 
N 
Y 
BID B 
Y 
N 
The probabilities of these combinations of events can be computed from the 
fundamental failure probabilities. 
Similarly, the loss of BIU to actuator communication can come about 
in two ways. 
BID A 
Y 
N 
BID B 
N 
Y 
Actuator B 
N 
Y 
Actuator B 
Y 
N 
The total probability of loss of bus communication can then be determined by 
combining the failure probabilities of the individual contributing events. 
Loss of Aircraft. This can come about in two ways which are indi-
cated in the fault tree of Figure 19. The probability of loss of BIU 
communication in phases 1 through 5 has already been computed. The probability 
of loss of eight processors is given by p8, where p is the probability of loss 
of a single processor in 75 minutes, 
-75 p = 1-exp{60x100}= 0.0119283 
p8 is then of the order of 10-16 , which is trivial compared to the probability 
of loss of communication. 
Successful, Late Landing at Original Destination. The fault trees 
for this case are shown in Figures 20 and 21. The situation is different 
depending on whether Cat II is required or not, so a separate fault tree 
must be prepared for each case. 
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Loss of Aircraft 
(phases 1-5) 
43.6387 x 10-6 
43.6387x10-6 0.0 
Loss of BIU 
connnunication 
Loss of 8 or more 
processors 
FIGURE 19. FAULT TREE FOR LOSS 
I OF AIRCRAFT 
~. 
-, 
:<: processors 
c,ut, end I ;thase 4 
----=-r-' 
5. 81671XIO 
o 
of 
8 
J 
Sllccessful late 
landing, no Vii: II 
6.007660623XlO·3 
5.816456857)(10.3 
I 
.-- 1. 872478506 X10·4 
i 
3.955897832X10·6 
r--------L~~~I 
Successful, 2 
processors out, 
end phase 4 
BIU 
co:nmunica tion 
OK 
0.99995648 
1 
of 
2 
of 
8 8 
3 
of 
8 
~---.l._1~'-=.,0~000001 
,oss of 5 
r less 
ut of 8 
roc., 
hase 5 
4 
of 
8 
5 
of 
·8 
L87256XlO· 
Successful, 3 
processors out, 
end phase 4 
, BlU 
i comm. 
10K 
I 
I 
0.99995648 
o 
of 
7 
L--
~f 110: 
7 I 17 
3 
of 
7 
Successful, 4 
processors Ollt, 
end phase 4 
BIU 
conun. 
OK 
3.95607XIO·6 
4 
of 
7 
0.99995648 
o 1 
of of 
6 6 
or less 
ut of 6 
proc., 
hase 5 
2 
of 
6 
FIGURE 20. PROBABILITY OF SUCCESSFUL, LATE LANDING, NO CAT II REQUIREMENT 
:1 i J J J J ) .1 ) 
3 
of 
6 
c-
OO 
) 
-' J ) } 
"' 
5.816456857~10-3 
Successful, 2 
processors ou t, 
end phase 4 
2 processors/ I BIU i 
out, end . communicatio 
phase 4 OK 
5.31671)(10-3 0.99995648 
o 
of 
8 
1.0 
r"~ 2 or less out of 8 I proc. 
phase 5 I 
1 
of 
8 
" -l .. -:1 .. _. 'I 
r.;:,~~."-." ,.,~-~ 
SUCCE'"sful late 
11and'"' I, Ca' 11 
i 
Successful, 3 
pro.:essors out, 
end phase 4 
~ND 
I 
3 processors BIU 
out, end communication 
phase 4 OK 
1.87256XlO- 0.99995648 
2 
of 
8 
-" J ",I . ~ -}-- 1 ._.[ ... ) 
Successful, 4 
processors, out 
end phase 4 
AND 
"'J '- _.) .-.) 
'" \.0 
0.999994748 J I 0.997004496 
o 
of 
7 
loss of 
1 or 
less out 
of 7 
proc. 
phase 5 
1 
of 
7 
4 processors 
out, end 
phase 4 
3.95607xlO-u 
~ 
BIU loss of 
communica tion o out 
OK of 6 
proc. in 
0.99995648 phase 5 
FIGURE 21. PROBABILITY OF SUCCESSFUL, LATE LANDING, CAT II REQUIREMENT 
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The total probability of a safe late landing is: 
0.95 x 6.007660623xlO-3 + 0.05 x 6.007647772xlO-3 
= 6.00765998lxlO-3 • 
Safe Diversion. To have diversion, it must happen that during phases 
3, 4, or 5, Cat II capability is needed and not available. If Cat II capability 
is loss before 75 minutes, diversion will take place. This will happen if 5, 
6, or 7 processors are lost and BIU communication is not lost and Cat II is 
required. The fault tree for this case is shown in Figure 22. 
Abort. For this to occur in phase 1 it would be necessary to lose 
seven processors in three minutes. The probability of this is of the order 
10-23 . The probability of aborting by the end of phase 2 is of the order 
10-19 . Accordingly, the abort probability is taken as zero. 
Collection of Results. In addition to the above computations, it 
was necessary to repeat some of the analyses on a phase-by-phase basis. These 
are done by repetition of the types of analysis given above. The results for 
this problem are summarized below. 
Pr (successful, on-time landing, orig. destination) 
Pr (successful late landing, orig. destination) 
E (economic penalty for late arrival) 
Pr (diversion, safe landing) 
E (economic penalty for diversion) 
Pr (aborting, safe landing at origin) 
E (economic penalty for aborting) 
Pr (aircraft lost, phase 1) 
Pr (aircraft lost, phase 2) 
Pr (aircraft lost, phase 3) 
Pr (aircraft lost, phase 4) 
Pr (aircraft lost, phase 5) 
Pr (aircraft lost) 
E (economic penalty) 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
0.993948634 
0.006007659 
$53.3525 
l4.04xlO-9 
$0.002808 
o 
o 
69.993xlO-9 
870. 38xlO-9 
28.8957xlO-6 
10. 3873xlO-6 
3. 292lxlO-6 
43.5l55xlO-6 
$53.3553 
.- I .. -'I .~---) ':"') '---.-'} -'-, -----}---." '---'1 '-:-''\ .--'. --'-'1 '~-1 .---) .--- ----'J ._.-'} '-.--) ---1 
.1 }.I.. _ I _ 
Safe Diversion 
----~-- 8 
1. 404097646 )(10 
AND 
-.-.-.-
--_IIJ-I _____________ ----, 
2.80831751)(10-7 
"'I 
0.05 
Loss of 5,6, or 7 
processors prior 
to t=75 
CAT II required 
~ 1 
E~f7 lout of 10 
. 
loss of 5 /loss of 6 
out of 10 out of 10 
2.8009775i8~-10-7 7. 339991694xlO-10 0.0 
FIGURE 22. FAULT TREE FOR SAFE DIVERSION 
0.99995648 
I 
BIU 
communication OK 
........ 
I-' 
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Solution Effort 
The time required for solution of this problem by the fault-tree 
technique was 22 man-hours. This included set-up, drawing of the fault trees, 
and all computations. 
CROSS-TRAINING PROBLEM ANALYSIS 
Summary of Results 
Performability analysis and fault trees were applied to the cross-
training problem, which was a simplified version of the multi-processor problem. 
The analyst who had been responsible for performability analysis applied fault 
trees to this problem. Performability analysis was applied by the analyst who 
had been responsible for fault trees. 
Training requirements were quite different for the two techniques. 
Only one trainee man-hour was required for the fault-tree method. Twenty-eight 
trainee man-hours were expended learning performability analysis. In addition, 
approximately four hours of assistance from the performability analyst were 
used to clarify the written descriptions of the technique. 
Fourteen man-hours were spent on the complete fault-tree solution. 
Performability analysis required 26 man-hours to est?blish the model hierarchy 
and compute the probability for one mission outcome. The complete computations 
are estimated to require 60 to 80 man-hours. 
Performability Analysis Solution 
Learning the Technique 
In order to learn the method, two principal avenues were used. One 
was study of several papers and reports written by Meyer and his students, and 
the other was discussion with Michael Bridgman who did the major work on 
Meyer's method in the present study. It was found that the availability of 
Mr. Bridgman was a very great benefit in developing an understanding of the 
method. It would have taken several times longer without this resource. 
'-. 
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The available papers are not designed for tutorial purposes, and they 
contain many points which are difficult to understand at first reading. If the 
technique is to become widely used, it may be necessary to develop materials 
which are (1) more comprehensible and (2) contain better motivation for the 
reader in terms of explaining the advantages of Meyer's method over other 
methods. 
Analytical Summary 
Problem Structure. There is more than one way to fit the problem 
into Meyer's format. The one selected here seems to be logical, but there are 
c~rtain1y others which could be defended. Three levels were defined: (1) the 
accomplishment set, (2) the "aircraft level", and (3) the base process. The 
accomplishment set is defined as follows: 
a = successful, on-time landing at original destination 
o 
al successful but late landing at original destination 
= safe diversion 
= safe abort 
loss of aircraft 
The overall objective is to determine the probabilities of these various 
outcomes. 
The aircraft level is concerned with the capability of the avionics 
system during each phase of the flight. A trajectory at the aircraft level 
is defined by a vector, 
where 
j~ if there is full capability at the end of phase i if only augmentation and control are operating at the qi = end of phase i 
l ~ if only augmentation is operable at the end of phase i if all capability is lost at the end of phase i 
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(1 if Cat II capability is required 
x6 = 
o if Cat II capability is not required 
The base level trajectory is defined by the vector 
where xi' i 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, is the number of LRU's operating at the end of 
phase i and x6 is as defined above. 
The three levels, and the mapping between them, can be portrayed as 
follows: 
Accomplishment 
Aircraft Level 
Base Model 
Mapping From Aircraft Level to Accomplishment Set. Rather than 
define the complete mapping K , it was decided to consider only the accom-
0 
plishment level a . In this problem, the aircraft level trajectories which 
0 
produce a can be enumerated. They are: 
0 
VI: (3 3 3 3 3 *) 
V2 : (3 3 3 3 2 *) 
V3: (3 3 3 3 1 0 
where, following Meyer's notation, the symbol * is used to denote a case in 
which the component can take on any value on its range. 
(1) 
Mapping From Base Model to Aircraft Level. It remains to establish 
the mapping from the base model to these aircraft level trajectories. From 
the definition of the problem, it can be seen that the first of the trajec-
tories (1) is produced by the Cartesian trajectory set: 
VI = {9,lO}x{9,lO}x{9,lO}x{9,lO}x{9,lO}x{*} (2) 
Computation of Probability. To evaluate the probability of a trajec-
tory set of this type, the following result of Wu and Meyer (Reference 9, 
Theorem 1) may be used: 
~, 
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(3) 
where 1(0) is a row vector of the probabilities of being in the various states 
x = 0,1, 2, ..• , 10 at the start of the problem, F is a column vector all of 
whose elements are unity. Pk is a state transition matrix whose elements are 
Pk(i,j) = probability of being in state j at the end of phase k, given that 
system was in state i at the beginning of phase k. Gk is a matrix defined by 
f 1 if i = j and i£~ 
= t 0 otherwise 
,- where ~ is the set of allowed states in V during the kth phase. 
Evaluation of Equation 3 is rather complex. It involves multipli-
~ cation of ten matrices. In this case, the problem is somewhat simplified by 
that fact that most of the components are zero, and the matrices to be 
:~ multiplied are actually only 2 x 2. This is still a substantial computation 
task, however. For each phase, the product PkGk is of the form 
,-
r-. , 
r 
, . 
! 
r, 
p(O,O) ... p(O,lO) 
p(l,O) 
i 
LP(lO,O) ... p(lO,lO) 
o 
o 
o o 
= 
o 
o 
p(9,9) p(9,10) 
p(lO,9) p(10,9) 
Since Pk (9,lO) = 0 for all k, it is necessary only to compute the three 
remaining probabilities. 
where Uk is the probability of failure of a single LRU during phase k. 
(4) 
(5) 
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-3 4.99875l0xlO-4 Ul = l-exp{60xlOO} 
-8 1. 3324449xlO-3 U2 = l-exp{60xlOO} = 
-51 8.4639771xlO-3 (6) U3 = l-exp{60xlOO} = 
-10 1. 6652786xlO-3 U4 = l-exp{60xlOO} = 
Substituting the values of (6) into the transition probabilities of (5), and 
substituting those results into the matrices indicated in (4), and mUltiplying 
. 
the five resulting matrices in the proper order gives 
P (V ) = [0 
r 1 
1] 
[
0.89359715 
0.11100440 
The second vector in (1) implies the Cartesian set 
V2 = {10,9}x{10,9}x{10,9}x{10,9}x{8,7,6}x{*} 
while the third vector in (1) implies 
0.99350111 (7) 
(8) 
All these trajectory sets are identical through the first four phases. Making 
the necessary changes in the fifth phase, the resulting probabilities are: 
P r[V 2] 4.906859xlO-4 
P
r
[V3] = 0(10-
12) 
(10) 
The probability of a is, then, the sum of the three probabilities. 
o 
P [a ] = 0.99399179 
r 0 
(11) 
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Solution Effort 
A total of 28 man-hours were expended learning the method to the 
degree needed to solve the sample problem. An additional 26 hours were 
required to compute the results given above. The majority of this computation 
time was used in multiplying the matrices. 
It should be kept in mind that only the accomplishment level a was 
o 
considered. A complete solution of the problem would have required evaluation 
of the other four accomplishment levels. Each would require a time approxi-
mately the same as that expended here. All computations were done by hand 
using a desk calculator. 
Obviously, computer assistance would greatly reduce the time required 
and the total resources required for a solution. For this problem, however, 
it seems clear that Meyer's method requires a computation time perhaps an order 
of magnitude greater than that for the corresponding fault-tree solution. 
Fault Tree Solution of Cross-Training Problem 
Analytic Summary 
Five mission outcomes were specified by the problem statement. One 
fault tree was constructed for each outcome. The fundamental events for a 
given tree specified the number of processors which were failed at the ends 
of particular phases and the presence or absence of Category II weather. In 
some cases involving "AND" logic gates, one event was conditioned upon 
occurrence of another event. The probability equations were written directly 
using the fundamental events for each tree. The numerical results are shown 
in Table 17. 
Solution Effort 
Constructing the fault trees and computing the probabilities required 
ten man-hours. Since the sum of the probabilities of all outcomes did not 
equal 1.0, an error was indicated. Two man-hours were expended finding the 
error (which was a multiplication error). Two more man-hours were spent 
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TABLE 17. PROBABILITY RESULTS OF FAULT TREE ANALYSIS 
OF CROSS-TRAINING PROBLEM 
Mission Outcome Probability 
Safe, on-time, original destination 0.993992 
Safe, late, original destination 0.006008 
Safe, diversion 4xlO-9 
Safe, aborted (land at origin) 0 
Loss of aircraft 2xlO-14 
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checking other computations. The total time expended on the problem was 14 
man-hours. 
Discussion 
The fault trees for the cross-training problem were directly con-
structed from the problem statement. No significant difficulties were 
encountered. Some assistance was gained from having solved the multi-
processor problem, which was simplified to create the cross-training problem. 
Conditional combinations of fundamental events were used to express 
outcomes sensitive to the phase in which a certain level of degradation is 
r~alized. Care was required to ensure that all combinations resulting in each 
outcome were included. In addition, care was required in writing the correct 
probability expressions for the fundamental events. 
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The objective of this study was to assess performabi1ity analysis 
in terms of its capabilities, practical usefulness, and costs of application. 
The assessment method was to solve sample problems using performabi1ity 
analysis and fault trees and then compare results. One analyst was assigned 
to each technique. The assignment was reversed for the last sample problem. 
The analysts had neither learned nor applied either technique prior to this 
study. An automated technique, TASRA, was used in two problems for further 
comparison. 
Preceding sections of this report synopsized the techniques, 
presented the sample problems, and summarized the results of analyzing each 
problem with the various techniques. This section discusses the conclusions 
and recommendations derived during this investigation. 
LEARNING REQUIREMENTS 
Much more time and effort is required to learn performabi1ity 
analysis than to learn the fault tree approach. "Learn" is assumed to include 
"understand the underlying theory". Although formal material could be helpful 
for learning fault trees, it is not required. The basic fault tree approach 
is conceptually simple and can be learned in a matter of hours. Performabi1ity 
analysis could require a man-week or more to attain the same level of under-
standing using currently available material. The concept of functional 
dependencies, the model hierarchy, and the computational methods all contribute 
significantly to the requirements. Tutorial material, which does not currently 
exist for performabi1ity analysis, could reduce the learning time. Even with 
such material, performabi1ity analysis will still require more time and effort 
to learn. 
The analysts assigned to performabi1ity analysis and fault trees had 
solid mathematical backgrounds. They both found that performabi1ity analysis 
required much more mathematical background than fault trees. The nature of the 
relationship between level of mathematical background and the time and effort 
required to learn each technique is diagrammed in Figure 23. The vertical 
r 
r 
,- Learning 
Time and 
Effort 
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High 
Performability Analysis 
1 
------- Fault Trees 
Low ~ _________ -_~_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-~_-~_-~~~ ____ __ 
Limited Extensive 
Mathematical Background 
FIGURE 23. CONCEPTUAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
LEARNING REQUIREMENTS AND 
MATHEMATICAL BACKGROUND 
82 
asymptote for performability analysis indicates that minimum background 
requirements for understanding the technique are much greater than fault trees. 
Concepts related to the asymptote are composition of functions, inverse 
functions, projection mappings, set manipulations, and matrix multiplication. 
APPLICATION EFFORT 
* For the sample problems used in this investigation, performability 
analysis required significantly more solution effort than the fault tree 
approach. For the dual-dual problem, TASRA required less effort than fault 
trees or performability analysis, but TASRA was not exercised to the same level 
of conceptual accuracy. Table 18 summarizes the man-hours expended for the 
different problems. The figures shown include time to become familiar with 
the problem as well as modeling and computation times. 
The dual-dual problem was found to have characteristics beyond the 
designed capabilities of TASRA. In particular, TASRA was not structured to 
handle multiple-phase missions involving dependencies among functions or 
components. Some hand manipulations were necessary to approximate the logical 
connections between phases. Since no significant information was gained by 
applying TASRA to the dual-dual problem, it was not applied to the other two 
problems. TASRA is not discussed any further in this report. 
The time differences between performability analysis and the fault 
tree approach are believed to represent differences between the two techniques 
and not differences in analyst capability. The sample problems did not involve 
details of flight control or computing systems which could give one analyst an 
advantage regardless of solution technique. In addition, the cross-training 
problem solutions exhibited solution time differences similar to those of the 
dual-dual and multi-processor problems. 
Performability analysis utilizes a hierarchy of models to connect 
the mission outcomes of interest (i.e., the accomplishment levels) to sets of 
possible component behaviors. The model hierarchies were not uniquely defined 
by the problem statements. The time required to define and select a hierarchy 
* The series-parallel problem is excluded from this discussion because its 
extreme simplicity provides a poor basis for comparing techniques. 
i'"' , 
r-. 
r-
: 
-
r 
r 
,-
I 
! 
( 
r 
,-
I 
,--. 
, 
! 
,--. 
! 
I 
-! ' 
,--
Dual-Dual 
Multi-Processor 
Cross-Training 
83 
TABLE 18. SOLUTION MAN-HOURS SUMMARY 
* Man-Hours for Solution 
Performability Fault Trees 
46 
59 
** 26 
30 
22 
14 
TASRA 
25 
* Includes model construction and computations. Does not include detailed 
computational checks. 
** Represents partial problem solution as described in the text. 
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was approximately twenty percent of the total solution time for the dual-dual 
and multi-processor problems. 
The process of determining the set of base model trajectories associ-
ated with each mission outcome consumed about one third of the total solution 
time. Every mathematically possible trajectory is expressed at each step in 
the model hierarchy, even if it has a zero probability of occurrence or is not 
physically possible. This is inefficient in terms of time requirements. 
However, as noted under the heading "Solution Accuracy", this allows for a 
logical correctness test which can increase confidence in the accuracy of the 
solution. 
Probability computations accounted for 40 to 50 percent of the 
solution time for performability analysis. A state transition matrix was 
required for each mission phase. All possible transition probabilities had to 
be computed. Matrix multiplications were then performed for each mission 
outcome. Many quantities were zero or negligible (less than 10-~2), but time 
was still spent on them. A significant amount of time was spent checking the 
computations for numerical accuracy. 
The fault-tree approach focused only on events of interest. Each 
mission outcome required a separate fault tree. Physically impossible events 
or combinations of events were not included in either the trees or the 
associated probability computations. 
Expressing dependencies among functions or components, for one or 
several phases, in terms of fault trees, required some ingenuity and the use 
of conditional probabilities and combinations of events. Performability 
analysis has a structure oriented towards capturing dependencies. Dependencies 
are expressed at the model level (e.g., mission, function, component) at which 
they occur. The procedure for determining the base model trajectories associ-
ated with each mission outcome maintains all dependencies expressed at 
intermediate model levels. 
The sample problems involved a small number of functional depen-
dencies. Examples include the related and interdependent requirements for the 
digital air data, AHRS, and INS in the dual-dual problem and the conditions 
for diversion in the multi-processor problem. The presence of few dependencies 
is viewed as an advantage for fault trees. 
i • 
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A few dependencies, multiple phases, and several mission outcomes 
characterized the sample problems. For each outcome, the fault-tree approach 
only considered comb{nations of events resulting in that outcome. Performa-
bility analysis, on the other hand, considered all possible combinations of 
events. 
SOLUTION ACCURACY 
Performability analysis was found to have no inherent characteristics 
which make it more or less numerically accurate than other techniques. How-
ever, for very complex problems, performability analysis may result in a higher 
level of confidence that no mistakes have been made. Many of the set manipu-
. 
lations for determining base model trajectories are mechanical in nature and 
can be readily checked. At each level in the model hierarchy, counting 
procedures can be used to ensure the correct number of trajectories have been 
expressed. The actual probability computations involve matrix/multiplications 
which are tedious but can be checked. Also, the matrix computations have been 
automated (Reference 4). Fault-tree analysis, on the other hand, can involve 
conditional probabilities and clever modeling, both of which are more difficult 
to verify. 
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS 
Conclusions based on this investigation can be summarized as follows: 
o It is possible to learn and apply performability analysis 
using existing descriptive material. 
o Performability analysis requires much more effort to learn 
and understand than fault trees. 
o For the sample problems, performability analysis required 
more effort than fault trees. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS 
Implications of Complex Problems 
As noted above, performability analysis required more solution effort 
than the fault-tree method for the sample problems. The dual-dual and multi-
processor problems were only moderately complex. More complex problems can 
easily be envisioned. This recommendation is concerned with the effects of 
applying-the two techniques to more complex problems. 
Figure 24 diagrams the hypothesized conceptual relationship between 
problem complexity and solution effort for fault trees and performability 
analysis. Complexity can be described in terms of the numbers of outcomes of 
interest, dependencies, and mission phases, and of the fault types to be 
considered. Solid lines are used in the region of the graph represented by 
the sample problems. Dashed lines represent hypothesized behavior of the 
techniques. 
The hypothesized behavior is based on the following factors: 
o Familiarity with performability analysis 
o Study of application of performability analysis to the 
SIFT computer (Reference 3) 
o Extrapolations based on the sample problems. 
Several technique characteristics which support the hypotheses are described 
in the following paragraphs. 
Consider the fault-tree approach. Each mission outcome requires a 
separate fault tree. Increasing the number of phases tends to increase the 
number of fundamental events which must be considered. Increasing dependencies 
could cause the solution requirements to increase dramatically in terms of time 
and ingenuity because of logical interconnections among dependencies and a 
large number of possible event combinations. 
Performability analysis requirements appear to be less sensitive to 
increases in outcomes, phases, and dependencies. All base model trajectories 
are included regardless of the number of dependencies. More outcomes simply 
require the trajectories to be divided into more sets. More matrix multipli-
cations are also required. Additional phases tend to increase the number of 
mechanical steps but do not require a great deal in terms of analyst ingenuity. 
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Only permanent faults were treated in the sample problems. Transient 
faults are quite difficult to handle with fault trees. The only known approach 
is to treat components subject to transient faults with availability equations, 
which tend to become complex. A component subject to transient and permanent 
faults may need to be treated as two components. This could cause fault trees 
to become very cumbersome. Performability'analysis uses a state approach, 
which lends itself more readily to modeling transient faults (this issue is 
addressed in more detail below). 
It is recommended that a highly complex problem be investigated using 
performability analysis and fault trees to determine if the relationship 
depicted in Figure 24 is conceptually accurate. One approach would be to 
8nalyze the SIFT computer problem (Reference 3) and then compare results and 
effort with the performability solution. A second approach would be to define 
a new problem such as a next-generation transport aircraft (post-Boeing 767) 
with computers based on the FTMP architecture (Reference 15), and apply both 
techniques to the problem. 
Ability to Model Transient Faults 
Faults may be classified as either permanent or transient. The 
sample problems only considered permanent faults. The ability of performa-
bility analysis to model transient faults was not addressed by the sample 
problem solutions. However, study of the technique indicated that it could 
handle transient faults through appropriate definition of the base model. 
This claim could be verified by defining a problem involving transient faults 
and then proceeding with performability analysis until solution feasibility 
is clearly established. 
Software Errors 
It is recommended that no attempt to include software error models 
in fault trees or performability analysis be made at this time. No validated 
fundamental model of software errors is known to exist. Consequ~ntly, it it 
not feasible to determine if one technique is preferable in terms of modeling 
software errors. 
. , 
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Tutorial Material for Performability Analysis 
The material used for learning performability analysis consisted of 
status reports by Meyer (References 1, 2, and 3) and technical papers 
(References 5-9). The status reports focus on technical developments achieved 
during the reporting period. The technical papers focus on particular aspects 
of the technique. None of this material was written for tutorial purposes. 
As a result, the effort to learn performability analysis was much greater than 
necessary, Tutorial material to explain the theory and application of the 
technique should be developed. 
Performability Analysis Tools 
A large proportion of the effort in applying performability analysis 
is mechanical in nature. Automated tools could potentially reduce the time 
and effort required to derive solutions. An interactive computer program for 
the probability computations exists (Reference 4). It should be validated. 
Two potential areas for tools are model building and formulation of 
the capability function (including computation of the base model trajectory 
sets corresponding to the mission outcomes). A tool for the first area would 
probably be an interactive aid. The second area might be amenable to complete 
automation. It is recommended that these possibilities be investigated. 
OBSERVATIONS 
This section presents several observations on the evaluation of 
fault-tolerant computing systems. They are neither conclusions nor recommen-
dations, but they reflect important practical considerations which came to 
light during the study. 
Credibility of Solution 
Reliability of a fault-tolerant computing system is a complicated 
and sensitive exercise. Such systems have complex structures and logic paths. 
The desired system failure probability is typically so small that the numerical 
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techniques used in the analysis may cause significant errors. Currently avail-
able reliability models have limitations in these areas of adaptability to 
system configurations and numerical accuracy. More capable models are also 
more difficult to exercise. Again, since the numbers of interest are so small, 
a slight computational or procedural anomaly could cause significant error. 
It may therefore be difficult to produce a solution which is uniformly accepted 
as credible. 
One approach to enhancing solution credibility would be to apply 
more than one technique to the system reliability problem. They could be 
applied by the same or different personnel. The goal would be to obtain 
concurrence on the result. 
Data Support of Models 
Accurate reliability estimation of ultra-reliable systems requires 
two key ingredients: a model with sufficient fidelity and data to support 
that model. The models applied in this study do not precisely capture all 
system characteristics (e.g., recovery strategies, timing difficulties), but 
it appears they can provide much more modeling precision than can be supported 
by currently available data. This is desirable since it is sometimes easier to 
generate engineering estimates of data for the components of an element rather 
than the entire element. In addition, the existence of advanced models helps 
justify collection of detailed data. However, with respect to the near-term, 
it may be more worthwhile to promote data collection than to increase the 
modeling precision of current reliability techniques. 
r 
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APPENDIX A 
DETAILS OF APPLICATION OF PERFORMABILITY 
ANALYSIS OF THE DUAL-DUAL PROBLEM 
This appendix provides details of the application of performability 
analysis to the dual-dual problem. The problem is described in an earlier 
section of the report. In addition, the performability analysis solution is 
summarized in the section entitled "Analysis Results". 
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Model Hierarchy 
Notation 
For 
The level 
The level 
The level 
is: 
Aircraft Performance Level Ys 
Mission Level (Level 0) xO 
Function Level (Levell) Xl 
Component Level (Level 2) X2 
The characteristic function is: 
2 Y = KOKlK2 : U >- A 
0 
u e U2 , 
y(u) = (KOKl K2)(u) 
KOCKI (K2(u~) 
characteristic function 
1 characteristic function 
2 characteristic function 
is: YO 
is: Yl 
is: Y2 
A 
uQ) KO 
ul ) Kl 
U2 ) 
K2 
= KO' 
= KOKl' 
= Y = KOKl2' 
The probability the mission results in accomplishment level B.n 
Accomplishment Set 
The set of mission outcomes in the Aircraft Performance Level is 
the accomplishment set A: 
where 
A = {aO' aI' a2} 
aO = safe flight and successful CAT II conditi~ns landing at the 
primary destination 
al = safe flight and landing at alternate destination 
a2 = unsafe flight, 
Accomplishment level aO requires that the conditions for "safe flight" and 
"no diversion" in the problem statement are satisfied, Failure to satisfy 
A-4 
the "no diversion" conditions will result in al as long as the "safe flight" 
conditions are met. If the "safe flight" conditions are not met, then aZ 
results whether or not the "no diversion" conditions are satisfied. 
Mission Level (Level 0) Model 
and 
Let 
if no diversion occurs 
otherwise 
h Z = fl if the flight is safe 
\ 0 otherwise. 
The Level 0 trajectory space is: 
\ [:~] hi E (O,l! I 
The Level o inverses are: 
YO -1 (aO) = Ko-l(ao) = lL~] I 
Y -1 
o (al) = KO -l(al) = l[~ ]) 
1 -1 YO- (a2) = KO (aZ) = l[:]l 
where * indicates "any possible value" (in this case, 0 or 1). 
Function Level (Levell) Model 
Let function i (i = 1,2,3,4) be the set of jobs performed by the 
components in set Si where: 
Sl {Radar altimeter, VOR, DME} 
Sz {DAD, AHRS, INS} 
S3 {Sensor RT, FCMS, Aft RT} 
S4 = {FCC-l, BIU-l, FCC-Z, BIU-Z} • 
r 
r 
. 
A-S 
Define 
2 if function i meets the "no diversion" requirements 
fi 1 if funciton i meets the "safe flight" requirements = 
but not the "no diversion" requirements 
0 otherwise. 
The Level 1 trajectory space is 
ul = 
f1 
f2 
f3 
f4 
I ~ E: {0,1,2} 
Ul ___ K-=l=--_;)~ uO __ K .... O---'::>~ A 
We need to determine Y1-1 = (KOK1) -1 for all an € A. This will be 
accomplished by characterizing K1-l for all uEU
O and then combining Kl -1 with 
Yo-l = KO-l (from the level 0 model). 
Let Ci (i = 1,2) be the mapping defined on uO as the projection onto 
the i th entry: 
Ci(u) = Ci 
Pictorially we have: 
£1 
f2 
€ Ul Kl >[:~J(uO KO f3 :> anE A 
f4 1 Ci 
hi 
The composite map CiK1: U1~{hi} relates each v € U1 to a single hi value. 
The inverse is defined as follows: 
(C i Kl )-l(hi ) = {v€U1 I Ci(Kl(v» = hi}. 
For u = [:~J€UO, the inverse image K1-1(u) € U1 can be written as: 
K1-l(u) = (C1K1)-1(h1) n (C2K1)-1 (h2). 
r 
We will specify (CiKl)-l(hi) for all hi (i=1,2) and then form Kl-l(u) for 
each u E Yo-l(a
n
). Finally, since Yo-1(an) c UO, we will form the inverse: 
yl-l(an) = (KOKl)-l(an) =UKl-l(u). 
u Yo-l(an) 
The inverses for the hi are as follows: 
For hI = 1 (no diversion): 
2 
(ClKl)-l(l) = 2 
2 
2 
For hI 
° 
(diversion): 
0 or 
(C K ) -1(0) 1 1 = * 
* 
* 
1 2 2 
0 or 1 2 
* ° 
or 
* * ) J 
2 
2 
1 2 
° 
or 1 
...J ) 
where * represents "any possible value" (in this case, 0, 1, or 2). 
For h2 1 (safe flight): 
1 or 2 
(C2Kl ) -1(1) = 1 or 2 
1 or 2 
1 or 2 
For h2 = ° (unsafe flight): 
- ~l ° 1 or 2 1 or 2 1 or (C 2Kl ) -1(0) = * ° 1 or 2 1 or * * ° 1 or 
* * * } ° J 
- , 
The inverses of the an are formed as follows: 
Recall 
,...... 
J I 
, 
r 
...... 
,.-
r-
K1-
1 (U2) = 
K1-
1 (u2) = 
2 
2 
2 
2 
-1 (C1K1) (0) 
1 
1 or 2 
1 or 2 
() 
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-1 (C2K1) (1) 
2 2 2 
1 2 2 
1 or 2 1 2 
1 or 2 1 or 2_ } 1 or 2 1 
and Y1-1(a1) = K1-
1 (U2)' 
Recall YO -1(a2) - {[:]} Let U3 4:]J. 
K1-
1 (U3) = (C1K1)-1(*) n 
and y1-
1(a2) = (C2K1)-1(0). 
Summarizing the Levell inverses: 
Y -l(a ) = 1 0 
Y -1(a1) = 
1 
y 1(a2) = 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 or 2 
1 or 2 
1 or 2 
0 
* 
* 
* 
2 
1 
1 or 2 
j 1 or 2 
1 or ] 0 * 
* ~ 
} 
2 
2 
1 
1 or 2 
~ 
1 or ~1 1 or 1 or 1 or 0 1 or 
* 0 
- f -
2 
2 
2 
1 
2 
2 
2 
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Component Level (Level 2) Model 
Let 
Xij = number of units of component i which are fault-free in 
Phase j (j=l,2). 
The component subscripts i (i=1,2, ••. ,13) and the domains of the Xij are 
defined in Table 1. The Level 2 trajectory space is the set of 13 by 2 
matrices. 
i = 1, 2 , ••• , 13 and j = 1, 2} • 
Rows of [Xij] correspond to components and columns correspond to phases. 
U2 can be functionally related to the accomplishment set A as follows: 
Y =K K 101 
U2 -------'>~ Ul------">~ A 
The inverses yl-l(an) were specified in the preceding section. 
We now need to specify Y -1 = (y K )-1 for all a € A. This will be accom-
212 n 
plished by characterizing K2-l for all vE Ul and then combining K2-l with 
-1 Yl • 
Let ai (i = 1,2,3,4) be the mapping defined on Ul as the pro-
jection onto the ith entry: 
Pictorially we have: 
Xu 2t12 
K2 fl Yl x2l x22 e. U2 :> € Ul )A f2 
f3 
.!4 
l xl3,l x13,2 a. 
~ 
V 
f. 
1. 
"'"""' 
"""' 
r 
, ..... 
, 
r 
r"' 
I 
r 
r 
,.-., 
I 
-i 
r 
,...... 
, 
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Then 
(<liK2)-1(f i ) = {w€U2 I eli (K2(W)) = f i } 
fl 
E. Ul , and for v = f2 
f3 
f4 
4 
K2 -l(v) = n (<liK2)-1(f i )· i=l 
According to the descriptions of performability analysis, the 
next steps are: 
• Specify the sets (<liK2)-1(fi) for all fi (i=1,2,3,4) 
• For each v€, Yl-l(an), determine K2 -l(v) using the intersections 
of the (<liK2)-1(fi) 
• Compute y-l(an) = U K2-l(v) 
v e. y -l(an) 
1 
• Compute P(an) = Pr (:-l(an» 
Each y-l(an) is a set of 13 by 2 [Xij] matrices in U2• The 
trajectory space U2 has the structure Q x Q where Q is the state space of 
l3-dimensional vectors: 
Q 
where each xi corresponds to Xij in Table 1 (i.e., the phase subscript j is 
omitted). 
Q is a space of dimension 13. While it is conceptually possible 
to find inverses of elements of Ul in U2 Q x Q and to develop the probability 
transition matrices, the practical aspects of such an undertaking are prohibi-
tive. 
We can proceed by decomposing Q into mutually independent subspaces. 
Two subspaces are independent if, for all q in the space, the values of the 
components of q in each subspace are not impacted by the values of the com-
A-10 
TABLE 1. COMPONENT VARIABLES Xij FOR THE LEVEL 2 MODEL 
Component i Domain of Xjj 
Radar Altimeter 1 0,1 
VOR 2 0,1,2 
DME 3 0,1,2 
DAD 4 0,1,2 
AHRS 5 0,1 
INS 6 0,1 
Sensor RT 7 0,1,2 
FCMS 8 0,1,2 
Aft RT 9 0,1,2 
FCC-1 10 0,1 
BIU-1 11 0,1,2 
FCC-2 12 0,1 
BIU-2 13 0,1,2 
,---' 
,-., 
! 
r 
r 
r 
,-, 
r 
, 
A-U 
ponents of q in the other subspace. By virtue of their independence, we can 
find inverses and compute probabilities in each subspace. From a practical 
point of view, the dimension of each subspace will be manageable. 
Decompose Q into four subspa~es, denoted by Qi' and defined as 
follows: 
The components for each subspace were chosen to assure mutually independent 
subspaces. Table 2, (which is based on Table 2 of the problem statement), 
formed the basis of selection. The DAD, AHRS, and INS interact and are 
grouped to form Q2' The FCCs and BIUs interact and are grouped to form Q4' 
The remaining components are all independent with respect to Q2' Q4' and each 
other. For convenience, they are grouped into two subspaces, each of dimension 
three. Note that the components in subspace i correspond to the components 
comprising function i. 
Since the fi are independent in terms of their contributions to 
the mission outcome, the performability analysis can be completed according 
to the following steps: 
• Specify (U i K2)-1(fi ) in the subspace Qi 
• Compute Pr(Fi=f i ) = Pr [(a i K2)-l(fi)] using equation 5 in 
Reference 1 (where F. represents function i) 
~ 
~l 4 
• For each v =~2 Eyl-l(an), compute IT Pr(Fi=f i ) i=l 
f3 
f4 
J J 
TABLE 2. COMPONENT REQUIREMENTS FOR MISSION PERFORMANCE LEVELS 
MINIMUM COMPONENT REQUIREMENTS 
Safe Flight Initiate CAT II Complete CAT II 
Component (both phclses) Land~ng (T=73_!linL 1a.nding (T=75 min) 
Radar Alt. 
Digital Air Data 
{1 0: J 
1 
2 (a: J AHRS 
INS 
VOR 
DME 
Sensor RT 
PU-I 
PU-II 
FCMS 
Aft RT 
where 
.J 
1 
1 
1 
1 
PU processing unit 
{1 or 1) 
2 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
PU-I: one FCC with one associated BIU 
PU-II: one FCC with both associated BIUs 
_ J J .J . .1 J 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
:r 
I-' 
N 
r 
r-
I 
r 
r 
,-., 
r 
I . 
r-. 
. ) 
• Sum the products 
4 
1T 
i=l 
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The procedure and computations for subspace QI are explained in 
some detail. Since subspaces Q2' Q3' and Q4 are treated analogously, ex-
planations are omitted from those computations. 
Subspace Ql. The inverse images (aIK2)-I(fl ) 
in terms of the trajectory subspace Ul 2 = QI x 
Using Table I we can form the following table: 
No Diversion 
Phase I Phase 2 
Xl I 1 
x2 2 1 or 2 
x3 1 or 2 * 
can be completely specified 
Ql where Q1 • [~m . 
Safe Flight 
Phases I and 2 
* 
* 
* 
where * represents "any possible value". From this table we can specify the 
(a. K )-1(£ ): 
1 2 I 
(a. K )-1(2) 
1 2 
(a.1 K2) -\1) 
Ur ~ [~r 2 D ~ J * * 2 * * -- , 
-
br J I ~ 1 2 0 
-1 (a.1 K2) (0) 0. 
A-14 
The states in the subspace Ql are diagrammed in Figure 1. We can 
write the elements of the above sets as Cartesian sets in terms of the state 
numbers: 
Hence, 
where 
where 
[ ~ l~rJ 
1 or 2 * J = {I, 2} x {I, 2, 3! 4, 5, 6} = VI 
[:2 j [:2j = {I, 2} x {7} = V2 
* 
* 
* 
(cx l K2)-1(2) 
(CX l K2)-1(1) 
( cx lK2) -1(0) 
= 
= 
= 
1 J ~ j = {3, 4, 5, 6, 7} x Q = V3 
VI 
V2 U V3 
0. 
From Reference 1 we have, for each Vi' 
Pr(Vi ) = reO) • PI • Gv . 1 . P2 . Gv . 2 . F ~, ~, 
reO) = [1 0 0 0 0 0 0] 
F = [ 1 1 1 1 1 1 l]t (t indicates "transpose") 
Pk = intraphase transition matrix for phase k 
GV k = characteristic matrix for Vn and phase k. n, 
The intraphase transition matrix is Pk [Pk(i,j)] 
Pk(i,j)= Pr (system ends phase k in state j I system begins phase k 
in state i). 
Each Pk(i,j) is expressed in terms of 
where 
Pn = exp(-Antk) 
qn = l-Pn 
Pr (component of type n does not fail in time tk) 
An = failure rate of a type n component 
tk duration of phase k. 
r;' 
, 
; 
, 
I 
1\ 
r 
r 
i 
r, 
! , 
....... 
, 
, , 
( ...... 
State 
Number 
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~2 
Q = {1,2,3,4,5,6,7} 
U = Q" x Q 
1 1 
FIGURE 1. STATE DIAGRAM FOR THE SUBSPACE Q1 
7 
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Figure 2 presents Pk for subspace Ql' Since the same model (i.e., subspace) 
is used in each phase, the only difference between PI and P2 is in their 
durations. 
The characteristic matrix for phase k of the Cartesian set Vn 
is GV k = [GV k (i,j)] where 
n, n, 
GV k(i,j) = {I if i;::j and n, 
o otherwise 
i e kth state set of Vn 
The role of GV k is to select the output states of the intraphase transition 
n, 
matrix Pk which correspond to the Caresian set Vn· MUltiplying Pk by GV k n, 
puts zeros in all columns of Pk except those corresponding to the phase k end 
states of Vn . 
The symbolic computations to derive Pr(Vn) in terms of the Pk(i,j) 
are as follows: 
VI {1,2} x {1,2,3,4,5,6} 
1 1 
GV = 1 0 GV 2 = 1 0 1, 1 1, a 1 
o 
o a 
reo) . Pv 1 , 
PV,2 . Gv 2' F = ~ 
P2(1,1) + P2(1,2) + P2(1,3) + P2(1,4) + P2(1,5) + P2(1,6) 
P2(2,2) + P2(2,4) + P2(2,5) + P2(2,6) 
P2(3,3) + P2(3,4) + P2(3,6) 
P2(4,4) + P2(4,6) 
P2(5,5) + P2(5,6) 
P2(6,6) 
0 
-:.) -. J ) -) .-- )---).-.-J .-.)-- J "1 -.") .. ---) -. 1 . -') --'1 -)~-- J ,- -)-, , .. ) ---'1 "-- J 
r-
2 2 2 2 
4P lP 2q 2P 3q 3 
2 2 
2P lP 2q 2q3 
2 
ql + P1q 2 
2 
P1P2 P3 2P1P 2 P3q 3 2P1PZq 2P3 P lP 2 q3 
0 2 P lP 2 P3 0 2P lP 2q 2P 3 
2 
P1P2 q3 2P 1 P 2q 2q 3 ql + P1
q 2 
2 
0 0 P lP 2P 3 
2 
2P lP 2P 3q 3 0 P1P2q 3 
2 
ql + P1q 2 
Pk 0 
0 0 P1P2P3 0 P1P2
q 3 ql + P1Q2 
2 2P1P2Q2 Ql + P1Q2 
2 
0 0 0 0 P1P2 :r 
I-' 
..... 
0 0 0 0 0 P1P2 Ql + P1Q2 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
FIGURE 2: INTRAPHASE TRANSITI.:JN MATRIX FOR SUBSPACE Ql. 
SUBSCRIPTS ON THE Pi TO INDICATE PHASE k ARE 
OMITTED. P. = exp[-Aitk ] Q. = 1 - p. 1. 1. 1. 
A-IS 
= reo) . P . G . P G F 
v,l V 1 V,2· V 2 . 1, 1, 
6 
= PI (1,1) • ,2: P2(I,j) J=1 
+ P1 (1,2) [P 2(2,2) + P2(2,4) + P2(2,5) + P2(2,6)] 
Next, V = {l,2} x {7} 2 
1 0 Gv 1 1 = 0 2, 0 
0 0 0 0 
= roo Gv 2 2, 
LO 
1(0) . PV,1 . Gv 1 = [PI (1,1) P1(1,2) 0 0 0 0 0] 2, 
P2 C1,7)l 
PV,2 Gv 2 . F 
P2 (2,7) I 
. = 2, P2 (3,7) i 
i 
P2 (4,7) i i 
! 
P2 (5,7) : 
P2 (6,7) ; 
P2 (7,7). 
-
Pr(V 2) = P1 (1,I)P 2(1,7) + P1 (1,2)P2(2,7) 
Next, V3 = {3,4,5,6,7} x {1,2,3,4,5,6,7} 
,-
iO I 0 
I C'~ 
I .' 
!- -
o 
1 
1 
1 
1 
reO) 
PV,2 . Gv 2 . F = Pv 2 F = [1 1 1 1 1 1 l]t 3, , 
o 
o 
o 
o 
1 
~ ; , 
..;"'I 
I • 
i 
~, 
I 
--I 
r 
r-, 
I 
"..... 
I 
r-. 
r-
I 
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From Table 1 of the problem statement: 
Component MTBF(hrs) 
1 Radar Alt. 700 .001429 
2 VOR 1000 .0010 
3 DME 1000 .0010 
The numerical inputs for the Pn,qn are as follows: 
Phase 1 Phase 2 
Component Pn qn Pr qr 
1 .99826341 1. 73659 E-3 .99995238 4.76180 E-5 
2 .99878407 1. 21593 E-3 .99996667 3.33328 E-5 
3 .99878407 1.21593 E-3 .99996667 3.33328 E-5 
where "E-a" represents 10-a . 
Using the above values and Figure 2, the following values are computed: 
P1 (1,1) = .99341698 
PI (1,2) = 2.41879 E-3 
P1 (1,3) 2.41879 E-3 
P1 (1,4) 5.88929 E-6 
P1 (1,5) = 1.47232 E-6 
PI (1,6) 3.58483 E-9 
PI (1,7) 1. 73806 E-3 
P2(1,1) = .99981907 
P 2 (1,2) = 6.66558 E-5 
P2(1,3) 6.66558 E-5 
P2(1,4) = 4.44379 E-9 
P2(1,5) 1.11095 E-9 
P2(1,6) 7.4 E-14 
P2(1,7) 4.76191 E-5 
A-20 
P2(2,2) = .99985240 
P2 (2,4) 6.66580 E-5 
P2(2,5) = 3.33290 E-5 
P2 (2,6) = 2.22197 E-9 
P2(2,7) = 4.76191 E-5 
P2(3,3) = .99985239 
P2 (3,4) = 6.6657981 E-5 
P2(3,6) = l.11098 E-9 
P2(3,7) = 8.0949212 E-5 
P2(4,4) = .99988572 
P2(4,6) 3.333010 E-5 
P2(4,7) = 8.094921 E-5 
P2(5,5) = .99988572 
P2 (5,6) = 6.6660203 E-5 
P2(5,7) = 4.7619111 E-5 
P2(6,6) = .99991905 
P2(6,7) 8.0949212 E-5 
Substituting the Pk(i,j) values into the Pr(Vn) expressions yields: 
Pr (V1) = .995788 
Pr (V2) = 4.74208 E-5 
Pr (V3) = 4.16422 E-3. 
Finally, we have: 
Pr (F1=2) = Pr (V1) = .995788 
Pr (F1=1) = Pr (V2) + Pr (V3) = 4.21164 E-3 
Pr (F1=0) = Pr (0) = O. 
~A. 
---
~, 
.;-
I 
, 
-, 
I 
I 
-. 
i I 
,..-. 
, 
r-
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Subspace Q?_ Each (a2k2)-1(f2), f2 € {O,1,2}, is a union of Cartesian sets in 
U2 2 = Q2 x Q2 where 
From Table 1 we have: 
No Diversion 
Phase 1 
2 
(:) or (:J 
Phase 2 
Safe Flight 
Phases 1,2 
Each q = is a state in Q2- Figure 3 displays the state diagram for Q2-
A-22 
State numbers 
/ 
3 
8 
FIGURE 3. STATE TRANSITION DIAGRAM FOR Q2. 
Q2 = {1,2,J,4,5,6,7,8,9,lO,11,12} 
U2
2 
= Q2 x Q2 
r 
-. , 
, 
r 
,-
, 
--. , 
; 
-
I 
,-
r-
., 
.-, 
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A state number is associated with each q € Q2' Using the state numbers we 
can rewrite the above table as: 
Condition 
States 
No Diversion 
Phase 1 
1,2,3 
Phase 2 
1,2,3,5, 
6,7,8,11 
Safe Flight 
Phases 1,2 
1,2,3, 
5,6,7 
The (a2K2)-1(f2) sets can now be written in terms of Cartesian 
sets of states in Q2: 
(a2K2)-1(2) = VI where 
VI = {no diversion, phase I} x {no diversion, phase 2} 
VI = {1,2,3} x {1,2,3,5,6,7,8,11} 
(a 2K2) -\1) = V2 u V3 where 
and 
and 
and 
V2 = {no diversion, phase I} x {diversion and safe flight, phase 2} 
V2 = {l,2,3} x ~ 
V3 = {diversion and safe flight, phase I} x {safe flight, phase 2} 
V3 {5,6,7} x {1,2,3,5,6,7} 
where 
V4 = {unsafe, phase I} x {all states, phase 2} 
V4 = {4,8,9,lO,11,12} x Q2 
Vs = {no diversion and safe, phase I} x {unsafe, phase 2} 
Vs {1,2,3} x {4,9,lO,12} 
V6 = {diversion and safe, phase I} x {unsafe, phase 2} 
V6 = {S,6,7} x {4,8,9,lO,11,12}. 
Figure 4 shows the intraphase transition matrix. The symbolic com-
putations for Pr(Vi ) are as follows: 
_. 
: 
P(I,I) P(I,2) P (1,3) P(I,4) P(1,5) P{I,6) p(l,7) P(I,8) P(I,9) P(I,10) P(I,ll) P{I,12) 
0 P(2,2) 0 P(2,4) 0 P(2,6) 0 0 P(2,9) P(2,10) 0 P(2,12) 
0 0 P{3,3) P{3,4) 0 0 P{3,7) 0 P{3,9) 0 P(3,ll) P{3,12) 
0 0 0 P(4,4) 0 0 0 0 P(l.,9) 0 P(4,1l) P(4,12) 
0 0 0 0 P(5,5) P(5,6) P(5,7) P (5,8) P(5,9) P(5,10) P(5,1l) P(5,12) 
PV,k 0 0 0 0 0 P(6,6) 0 0 P(6,9) P(6,10) 0 P(6,12) 
:t> 
I 0 0 0 P(7,7) P(7,9) P{7,ll) P{7,12) N 0 0 0 0 0 
"""' 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 P(8,8) 0 P(8,10) P(8,1l) P(8,12) 
0 O. 0 0 0 0 0 0 P(9,9) 0 0 P(9,12) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 P(10,10) 0 P(l0,12) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 P(ll,ll) P(11,12) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
_I 
FIGURE 4. INTRAPHASE TRANSITION MATRIX FOR V~Q2 AND PHASE k 
- _ J J ..... ) .. ) ,) J oj J } .J _ -J . _ 1 _ J I J ) 
J"'""'-
i . 
I 
~ 
! 
I 
I 
,-I 
I . 
--I 
~ 
: ' 
--I 
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VI = {1,Z,3} x {1,2,3,S,6,7,8,11} 
1(0) . Pv 1 GV 1 = [Pl(l,l) Pl(l,Z) Pl (1,3) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0] , 1, 
PV,Z . GVl,ZF = 
PZ(l,l) + PZ(l,Z) + P2(1,3) + P2(1,S) + PZ(1,6) + P2(1,7) + P2(1,8) + PZ(l'll~ 
P2(2,Z) + P2(Z,6) 
P2(3,3) +P2(3,7) + PZ(3,l1) 
0 
P2(5,5) + P2(5,6) + P2(S,7) + PZ(S,8) + PZ(5,11) 
PZ(6,6) 
P2(7,7) + PZ<7,11) 
P2(8,8) + PZ(8,11) 
0 
0 
P Z (11, 11) 
L 0 
-
Pr(Vl ) = 1(0) . PV,l . G • P 2' G Z· F Vl,l V, VI, 
= P1(1,1) [P 2(1,1) + PZ(1,2) + P2(1,3) + P2(l,S) + P2(1,6) + PZ(l,7) + P2(1,8) 
+ P2(1,11)] 
+ P1(1,Z) [P 2(Z,2) + P2(2,6)] 
+ P1(1,3)[P 2(3,3) + P2(3,7) + P2(3,11)] 
Pr(V2) = 0 (since Pr (0) = 0). 
Next, V3 = {S,6,7} x {1,2,3,S,6,7} 
1(0) . PV,l o 0 0 0 P1(1,S) Pl (1,6) P1(1,7) 0 0 0 0 0] 
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P V, 3 .• GV 2, 3 • F 
1-;2C1,1) + P2C1,2) + P2C1,3) + P2C1,S) + P2C1,6) + P2(1,7)! 
I 
P2(2,2) + P2(2,6) 
P2(3,3) + P2C3,7) 
o 
P2CS,S) + P2CS,6) + P2CS,7) 
P2C6,6) 
P2(7,7) 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
PrCV3) = P1 C1,S) [P2CS,S) + P2(S,6) + P2CS,7)] 
+ P1 C1,6)P2C6,6) + P1 Cl,7)P 2C7,7) 
Next, V4 = {4,8,9,10,11,12} x Q 
1(0) . Pv 1 • GV 1 
, 4, 
_I 
= [0 0 0 P1 C1,4) 0 0 0 P1(1,8) P1 (1,9) P1 (1,10) P1(1,11) P1 (1,12)] 
PV,2 . GV 2' F = [1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 l]t 4, 
Pr(V4) = P1 (1,4) + P1 C1,8) + P1(1,9) + P1 (1,10) + P1 (1,11) + P1 (1,12) 
Next, Vs = {1,2,3} x {4,9,10,12} 
r--
I 
f 
, 
.-, 
~ 
r~ 
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r 
,~ 
--. 
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PV,2 . GV 2· F = ~z(l'4) + PZ(1,9) + PZ(l,lO) + PZ(l,lZ) s, 
P2(2,4) + PZ(2,9) + PZ(2,10) + P2(2,12) 
P2(3,4) + P2(3,9) + P2(3,12) 
P2(4,4) + P2(4,9) + P2(4,12) 
P2(S,9) + P2(S,lO) + P2(S,12) 
P2(6,9) + PZ(6,lO) + P Z (6,12) 
P2(7,9) + P2(7,12) 
P2(S,10) + P2(8,12) 
P2(9,9) + P2(9,12) 
P2(10,10) + P2(10,12) 
P 2 (11,12) 
1 
Pr(VS) = P1(1,1) [P2(1,4) + P2(1,9) + P2(1,10) + P2(1,12)] 
Next, 
1(0) 
+ P1 (1,2) [P 2(Z,4) + P2(2,9) + P2(2,10) + PZ(Z,12)] 
+ P1(1,3) [P 2(3,4) + P2(3,9) + P2(3,11) + P2(3,lZ) 
V6 = {S,6,7} x {4,S,9,10,11,12} 
PV,l . G
V6 ,1 = [0 0 0 0 P1(1,S) P1(1,6) P1(1,7) o 0 0 0 0] 
GV 2 . F = P2(l,4) + P2(l,S) + P2(l,9) + P2(l,lO) + P2(l,ll) + P2(l'12~ 6, 
I P2(2,4) + P2(2,9) + P2(2,lO) + P2(2,12) 
P2C3,4) +P2C3,9) + P2(3,ll) + P2C3,12) I 
P2(4,4) + P2(4,9) + P2(4,ll) + P2(4,12) I P2(S,S) +P 2(S,9) + P2(S,lO) + P2(S,ll) + P2(S,12) I 
I 
P2(6,9) + P2(6,lO) + P2(6,12) 
I 
I 
I 
P2(7,9) + P 2 (7 ,11) + P 2 (7 ,IZ) 
I 
I 
I 
PZ(S,S) +.P 2(S,lO) + P2(S,ll) + P2(8,12) 
I 
I 
I j 
P2(9,9) + P2(9,12) 
P2(10,10) + P2(10,12) 
PZ(ll,ll) + PZ(ll,12) 
1 
Pr(V6) 
Using 
n 
4 
5 
6 
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= P1(I,S) [P 2(S,8) + P2(S,9) + P2(S,10) + P2(S,11) 
+ P1 (1,6)[P2(6,9) + P2(6,10) + P2(6,12)] 
+ P1 (1,7)[P2(7,9) + P 2 (7,11) + P 2 (7,12)] 
the MTBF data from the problem statement: 
Phase 1 Phase 2 
Pn qn Pn 
.99939185 6.08148 E-4 .99998333 
.99848032 1.51968 E-3 .9999S833 
.99595266 4.04734 E-3 .99988890 
The Pk(i,j) computations are: 
2 P1 (1,1) = P4 PSP6 = .99322997 
2 P1 (1,2) = P4 PSq6 = 4:036278 E-3 
2 P1 (1,3) = P4 qSP6 = 1.Sl1687 E-3 
2 P1 (1,4) = P4 qSq6 = 6.14318 E-6 
P1 (I,S) = 2P4q4PSP6 = 1.208798 E-3 
P1 (1,6) = 2P4q4PSQ6 = 4.91230 E-6 
P1 (1,7) = 2P4Q4QSP6 = 1.83978 E-6 
,., 
P1(1,8) = q4~ ~SP6 = 3.67788 E-7 
P1(1,9) 
P1 (1,10) 
P1 (1,11) 
P1 (1,12) 
= 2P4Q4QSQ6 = 7.47647 E-9 
2 
= Q4 PSQ6 = 1.49461 E-9 
2 5 
= Q4 Q P6 = 5.5977 E-10 
2 
= Q4 QSQ6 = 2.27 E-12 
P2(1,1) = .99981390 
P2(1,2) = 1.11097 E-4 
P2(1,3) = 4.16S99 E-S 
P2(1,4) = 4.62914 E-9 
P2(1,S) 3.33276 E-S 
P2 (1,6) = 3.70327 E-9 
qn 
1.66666 E-S 
4.16659 E-S 
1.1110S E-4 
-
+ P 2 (5,12) ] 
-~. 
I 
-, 
-. 
r 
I 
-, 
! ' 
r· 
,-, 
-
,--
PZ(1,7) = 1.389 E-9 
P2(1,8) = Z.78 E-10 
P2(1,9) = 1.S E-13 
PZ(1,10) = 3.1 E-14 
P2(1,11) = 1.2 E-14 
P2(1,lZ) = 1.3 E-18 
A-Z9 
Z PZ(Z,Z) = P4 Ps = .9999Z499 
Z PZ(Z,4) = P4 q5 = 4.16645 E-S 
PZ(Z,6) = 2P4q4P5 = 3.33313 E-5 
PZ(Z,9) = ZP4q4q5 = 1.38883 E-9 
Z PZ(Z,10) = q4 P5 = Z.78 E-10 
Z P2(Z,12) = q4 q5 = 1.16 E-14 
Z P2(3,3) = P4 P6 .99985556 
2 P2(3,4) = P4 q6 = 1.11101 E-4 
PZ(3,7) = ZP4q4P6 = 3.33Z89 E-5 
PZ(3,9) = ZP 4q4q6 = 3.7034 E-9 
Z PZ(3,11) = q4 P6 = Z.778 E-10 
Z P2(3,12) = q4 q6 3.1 E-14 
2 PZ(4,4) = P4 = .99996666 
PZ(4,9) = ZP 4Q4 = 3.333Z6 E-5 
2 PZ(4,lZ) = Q4 = 2.78 E-10 
P2(5,5) = P4P5P6 = .99983056 
PZ(S,6) = P4PSQ6 = 1.11099 E-4 
PZ(5,7) = P4QSP6 = 4.16606 E-5 
P2(5,8) = Q4PSP6 = 1.66641 E-5 
A-30 
P2(S,9) = P4qSq6 = 4.62921 E-9 
P2(S,10) = q4PSq6 = 1.8S2 E-9 
P2(S,11) = q4qSP6 = 6.94 E-10 
P2(S,12) = Q4QSq6 = 7.7 E-14 
P2(6,6) = P4PS = .99994~66 
P2(6,9) = P4QS = 4.166S2 E-S 
P2(6,10) = Q4PS = 1.666S9 E-S 
P2(6,12) = Q4QS = 6.9442 E-10 
P2(7,7) = P4P6 = .99987223 
P2(7,9) = P4Q6 = 1.11103 E-4 
P2(7,11) = Q4P6 = 1.66647 E-S 
P2(7,12) = Q4Q6 = 1.8S2 E-9 
P2(8,8) = PSP6 = .99984723 
P2(8,10) = PSQ6 = 1.11100 E-4 
P2(8,11) = QSP6 = 4.16613 E-S 
P2(8,12) = QSQ6 = 4.629 E-9 
P2(9,9) = P4 = .99998333 
P2(9,12) = Q4 = 1.66666 E-S 
P2(10,10) = Ps = .9999S833 
P2(10,12) = Qs = 4.166S9 E-S 
P2(11,11) = P6 = .99988890 
P2(11,12) = Q6 = 1.1110S E-4 
.--
.-i 
r ' 
, : 
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Summarizing the probabilities: 
Pr(F2=2) Rr (V1) 
= .99877758 
Pr(F2=1) = Pr (V2) + Pr (V3) 
o + 1. 21553 E-3 
1.21553 E-3 
= P
r
(V4) + Pr (V5) + Pr (V6) 
~ 
~ 
~ 
= 6.5208 E-6 + 3.4073 E-7 + 2.0674 E-8 
6.8822 E-6. 
0,1,2 , is a union of Cartesian sets 
No Diversion Safety 
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phases 1 and 2 
2 1 or 2 1 or 2 
2 1 or 2 1 or 2 
2: 1 or 2 1 or 2 
Each q = [::J is a state in Q3" Figure 5 presents the state diagram for Q3" 
A state number is associated with each q E Q3' Using the state numbers, we can 
rewrite the above table as: 
No Diversion Safe Flight 
Condition Phase 1 Phase 2 Phases 1 and 2 
states 1 1-8 1-8 
-1 The (a3K2) (f3) sets can now be written in terms of Cartesian sets of 
states in Q3 : 
A-32 
state number 
FIGURE 5. STATE DIAGRAM FOR S3 
(1 , 2 , 3,4 ,5 ,6 , 7 ,8 , 9) 
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r 
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where 
{no diversion, phase I} x (no diversion, phase 2} 
= {I} x {1,2,3,4,S,6,7,S} 
where 
V2 = {no diversion, phase ~ x {diversion and safe, phase 2} 
v 2 = {I} x cP 
and 
V3 = {diversion, phase I} x {safe flight, phase 2} 
V 3 = (2,3,4, S, 6,7, s} x {I, 2,3,4, S ,6,7, S} 
(a3K2)-1(0) = V4 u Vs 
where 
and 
V4 = (unsafe, phase I} x {all states, phase 2} 
V 4 = {9} x Q 
V S (safe, phase I} x {unsafe, phase 2} 
Vs = {1,2,3,4,S,6,7,S} x {9} 
Figure 6 shows the intraphase transition matrix. The symbolic computations 
for Pr(Vi) are as follows: 
VI = {I} x {1,2,3,4,S,6,7,S} 
[PI(I,I) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0] 
A-34 
-. 
PVk = [Pk(i,j)] ......... 
P(l,l) P(I,2) P(I,3) P(I,4) pel,S) P(I,6) P(I,7) P(I,8) P(I,9) 
0 P(2,2) 0 0 pe2,S) P(2,6) 0 P(2,8) P(2,9) 
0 0 P(3,3) 0 P(3,S) 0 P(3,7) P(3,8) P(3,9) 
.---
0 0 0 P(4,4) 0 P(4,6) P(4,7) P(4,8) P(4,9) 
= 0 0 0 0 peS,S) 0 0 P(S,8) P(S,9) 
0 0 0 0 0 P(6,6) 0 P(6,8) P(6,9) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 P(7,7) P(7,8) P(7,9) 
-.... 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 P(8,8) P(8,9) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I 
--
FIGURE 6. INTRAPHASE TRANSITION MATRIX FOR 
VSQ3 AND PHASE K '""'. 
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P • G 2-· F 
'1,.2 vI, 
= 
r-P2(1,1) + P2(1,2) + P2(1,3) + P2(1,4) + P2(1,5) + P2(1,6) + P2(1,7) + P2 (1,8) 
P2(2,2) + P2(2,5) + P2(2,6) + P2(2,S) 
P2(3,3) + P2(3,5) + P2(3,7) + P2(3,S) 
P2(4,4) + P2(4,6) + P2(4,7) + P2(4,S) 
P2(5,5) + P2(5,S) 
P2(6,6) + P2(6,8) 
P2(7,7) + P2(7,S) 
P2 (S,S) 
o 
S 
Pr(VI ) = PI (1,1)'2: P (l,j) 
. 1 2 J= 
V2 = {I} x <\l 
Pr(v) = 0 since Pr(<t» = 0 
V3 = {2,3,4,5,6,7,S} x {1,2,3,4,5,6,7,S} 
1(0) • P • G 
v,l v3,1 
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P • G • F 
v,Z v3,2 
= 
-P2(1,1) + P2(1,2) + PZ(I,3) + PZ(I,4) + PZ(I,5) + P2(1,6) + P2(1,7) + PZ(I,8) 
P2(Z,Z) + P2(Z,5) + PZ(2,6) + P2(Z,8) 
P2(3,3) + P2(3,5) + P2(3,7) + P2(3,8) 
PZ(4,4) + P2(4,6) + P2(4,7) + P2(4,8) 
PZ(5,5) + PZ(5,8) 
PZ(6,6) + P2(6,8) 
P2(7,7) + PZ(7,8) 
P2 (8,8) 
o 
Pr(v~ = Pl (I,2) [P2C2,2) + P2(2,5) + PZ(2,6) + P2(Z,8)] 
+ PI Cl,3) [PZ(3,3) + PZC3,5) + PZC3,7) + PZ(3,8)] 
+ PI CI,4) [PZ(4,4) + P2(4,6) + P2(4,7) + PZ(4,8)] 
+ P1 (1,5) [PZ(5,5) + P2(5,8)1 
+ PI (l, 6 ) [P 2 (6 , 6) + P 2 (6 , 8)] 
+ PIC 1,7) [p 2 (7, 7) + P 2 (7 , 8)] 
+ P1 (l,8) . PZC8,8) 
v4 = {9} x Q 
reO) . P
v
,1 . Gv4 ,1 = [0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 P1(1,9)] 
P Z. G 4 Z . F = [1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 l]t v, v , 
Pr (V 4) = PIC 1,9) 
.-
--. 
.-
--
, . 
-
I . 
r-. 
r 
I 
-, 
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V 5 = {l, 2,3,4,5,6,7, 8} x {9} 
I(o) • P • G 
v,l v5,l 
P • G • F = 
v,2 v5,2 
8 
P2(l,9) 
P2(2,9) 
P2 (3,9) 
P2 (4,9) 
P2 (5,9) 
P2(6,9) 
P2(7,9) 
P2(8,9) 
P2(9,9) 
pr(v5) = 2: Pl(l,j) . P2(j,9) 
J = 1 
Using the MTBF data from the problem statement, P
n 
= exp (-An t k), 
and q = l-P , we have: 
n n 
Phase 1 Phase 2 
n P qn P qn n n 
7 .99756962 2.43038 E-3 .99993334 6.66645 E-5 
8 .99939185 6.08148 E-4 .99998333 1.66666 E-5 
9 .99756962 2.43038 E-3 .99993334 6.66645 E-5 
A-3a 
The Pk(i,j) computations for Q3 are as follows: 
222 Pl(l,l) = P7 Pa P9 = .9a9110 
2 2 P1 (1,2) = 2P7q7Pa P9 = 4.a1953 E-3 
2 2 P1 (1,3) = 2P7 P8%P9 = 1.2037a E-3 
2 2 Pl (1,4) = 2P7 Pa P9q9 = 4.81953 E-3 
2 Pl (1,5) = 4P7ql8q8Pq = 5.86554 E-6 
Pl (1,6) = 4P7Q7Pa2P9Q9 = 2.34836 E-5 
2 P1(1,7) = 4P7 P8QaP9Q9 = 5.86554 E-6 
P1 (1,a) = aP7Q7PaQaP9Q9 = 2.85a04 E-8 
2 2 2 2. 2 2 P1 (1,9) = Q7 + (1-Q7 )qa + (1-q7)(1-q8 )q9 = 1.21a33 E-5 
P2 (1,1) = .999700 
P2 (1,2) = 1. 33298 E-4 
P2(1,3) = 3.33238 E-5 
P2(1,4) = 1. 33298 E-4 
P2(1,5) = 4.44332 E-9 
P2 (1,6) = 1. 77737 E-a 
P2(1,7) = 4.44332 E-9 
P2 (1,a) = 5.9 E-13 
P2(1,9) = 9.1661 E-9 
2 2 P2(2,2) = P7Pa P9 = .9997667 
2 P2 (2,5) = 2P7PaQ8P9 3.33260 E-5 
2 P2(2,6) 2P7PS P9Q9 = 1.33307 E-4 
P2(2,8) = 4P7PaqaP9q9 = 4.44362 E-9 
2 2 2 P2(2,9) = q7 + P7Q8 + P7(1-Qa )Q9 = 6.66692 E-5 
-
, 
."""\ 
--. 
, 
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r 2 2 P2(3,3) = P7 PSP9 = .999717 
P2(3,5) 
2 E-4 r- 2P7q7PSP9 = 1.33300 
P2(3,7) 
2 2P7 PSP9q9 = 1.33300 E-4 
r-' P2(3,S) = 4P7q7PaP9~ = 1.7774 E-a 
P2(3,9) = + P 2 + P (1- 2) 2 = 1.66755 
E-5 
, , qa aq7 a q7 q9 
ro. P2(4,4) 
2 2 
= P7 Pa P9 = .9997667 
P2(4,6) 
2 E-4 = 2P7q7Pa P9 = 1.33307 
~ , 2 P2(4,7) 2P7 PaqaP9 = 3.33260 E-5 
r-, P2(4,a) = 4P7q7PaqaP9 = 4.44362 E-9 
P2(4,9) 
222 
= q9 + P 9q7 + P 9 (1-q7 ) qa = 6.66692 E-5 
r 
P2(5,5) 2 .9997a3 = PlaP9 r-
; 
P2 (5,a) = 2P7PaP9q9 = 1.33309 E-4 
P2(5,9) = q7 + P7qa + P7PaQ9 
2 
= a.33344 E-5 
r 2 P2(6,6) = P7Pa P9 = .999833 
-
P2(6,8) = 2P7PaQ8P9 = 3.33282 E-5 
P2(6,9) = q7 + P7Q9 + P7P9Q8 
2 
= 1.33325 E-4 
,.-. 
P2(7,7) 
2 
= P7 PaP9 = .999783 
P2(7,a) = 2P7Q7P8P9 = 1.33309 E-4 
P2(7,9) = Q8 + P8Q9 + P8P9 Q7 
2 
= 8.33344 E-5 
P2(S,S) = P7PaP9 = .999850 
P2 (a,9) = Q7 + P7Q8 + P7PsQ9 = .000150 
A-40 
Summarizing the probabilities: 
Pr(F3 = 2) = Pr(Vl ) 
.989110 
Pr(F3 = 1) = Pr(V2) + Pr(V3) 
= o + .0108774 
= .0108774 
Pr(F3 = 0) = Pr(V4) + Pr(V5) 
= 1.21833 E-5 + 6.75688 E-7 
= 1. 2859 E-5. 
-1 Subspace Q4. Each (a4K2) (f4), f4 E {O,1,2}, is a union of Cartesian sets in 
U4
2 = Q4 x Q4 where 
x10 
X12 
xl3 
Since x10 ' x12 E {0,1} and xII' xl3 E {O,l,Z} , the number of states in 
Q4 is Z·3·Z·3 = 36. Lumping all states which correspond to unsafe flight 
reduces the number of states to 17. To reduce this number to a more manageable 
value, we will introduce an additional model level which describes processing 
units (PU). A PU is defined to be a FCC and its associated BIU's. We will 
first model the behavior of the function f4 in terms of PU's, and then model 
each PU in terms of its components. From the component model we will then be 
combined to derive the probabilities for the function f 4 . 
Let Yi be the random variable which denotes the state of PUi 
(i = 1,Z) where the states are defined as follows: 
FCC - i BIU - i 
(xlO or xlZ ) (x11 or xl3) Y. ~ 
1 Z 2 
1 1 1 
1 0 0 
0 * 0 
where * represents "any possible value". 
.--. 
- \ 
."'\ 
,-
-. i 
r-. 
r-. 
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A-41 
1 
{O,1,2}J The corresponding trajectory space is 
Based on Table 1, the Y. values for no diversion and safety 
~ 
can be specified as follows: 
No Diversion Safe Flight 
I Phase 1 Phase 2 IPhases 1 and 2 
Yl 2 ~orX \ ~ or '( 0 )1 Y2 2 * or ~ * or I 
1\ 
Let L denote the mapping L : U4----~:>~ {f4} • Using the above table and the 
state diagram for ~4 in Figure 7, we can specify the inverses L-l (f4) in 
terms of the state numbers: 
L-1 (2) VI 
where 
where 
and 
L-l(O) 
where 
and 
VI {no diversion, phase I} x {no diversion, phase 2} 
VI = (I} x {1,2,3,4,S,6,7,a} 
V2 u V3 
{no diversion, phase I} x {diversion and safe, phase 2} 
V3 {diversion and safe, phase I} x {safe, phase 2} 
V3 [2,3,4,S,6,7,a1 x {1,2,3,4,S,6,7,a} 
V4 v Vs 
V4 [unsafe, phase I} x [aU states, phase 2} 
A 
V4 9 x Q4 
Vs {safe, phase 11 x {unsafe, phase 2} 
Vs = [1,2,3,4,5,6,7,a} x {9} • 
A-42 
3 
6~state number 
~YIY2 
FIGURE 7. STATE DIAGRAM FOR ~4 AND EACH PHASE 
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The intraphase transition matrix P k is shown in Figure 8. 
v, 
The symbolic computations for Pr(V.) are as follows: 
~ 
VI = [I) x {1,2,3,4,5,6,7,S} 
1 1 
a 1 
a 1 
GV 1 = GV 2 = a 1 1, 0 1, a 1 0 a 1 
0 0 0 1 0 1 
0 0 
1(0) = [1 0 0 0 0 0 00 oj 
F = [1 1 1 1 'I 1 1 1 1) t 
Pr(V1) = 1(0) • P VI· GV 1· Pv 2 • G 2· F 
, 1 ' VI 
S ' 
, 
Pr(V1) = PI (1,1) • ~ P2(1,j) j=l 
V2 = ill x <p 
Pr(V2) = 0 since Pr(<p) = o. 
V3 = [2,3,4,5,6,7,S} x (1,2,3,4,5,6,7,Sj 
0 1 
1 1 
1 1 
GV3 ,1 
1 
GV3 ,2 
1 
= 
1 0 1 0 1 1 
0\ 0\ 
0 0 
1(0) and Fare as above. 
S 
(PI (l,j) . ~ P (j,k») Pr(V ) =~ 3 j=2 k=l 2 
_ .I 
-' 
FIGURE 8. INTRAPHASE TRANSITION MATRIX FOR e4 AND PHASE K. THE PHASE 
SUBSCRIPT K IS OMITTED FROM THE P(i,j) FOR CONVENIENCE 
) ___ J ' J ' .1 ) ) .' J J .J . ) J ,_') ._, J 
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-I 
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k-4S 
/\ 
P1(1,9) since Pr(Q4) = 1. 
Vs = [1,2,3,4,S,6,7,8} x {9} 
1 
1 
1 
1 
\0 
0\ 
o 
1(0) and F are as above. 
8 
Pr(VS) =!: P1 (1,j) P2(j,9). J=l 
o 
o 
o 
1 
Next, we can compute the PK(i,j) probabilities using the individual 
transition probabilities for each Y .. Let 
~ 
Wk(m,n) = pr[Yiends phase k in state n I Yi begins 
phase k in state~. 
The associated state diagram is: 
o 
FCC BIU 
Let PF Pr [FCC remains fault-free for the phase] 
PB = Pr ~ BIU remains fault-free for the phase] 
Then the Wk(m,n) may be expressed as follows: 
n 
Wk(m,n) 2 1 0 
2 PFPB 
2 2PFPBqB qF + PFqB 
m 1 0 PFPB qF + PFqB 
0 0 0 1 
~-----state number for Y 
l-P F 
q' = l-P B B 
A-46 
Using MTBF data and phase durations, 
Phase 1 Phase 2 
PF .99756962 .99993334 
qF 2.43038 E-3 6.66645 E-5 
PB .99878407 .99996667 
qB 1.21593 E-3 3.33328 E-5 
The above data are used to compute the Wk(m,n): 
n 
W1 (m,n) 2 1 0 
2 .99514514 2.42299 E-3 2.43185 E-3 
m 1 0 .99635664 3.64335 E-3 
0 0 0 1 
n 
W (m,n) 2 1 0 
2 
2 .99986668 6.66589 E-5 6.66656 E-5 
m 1 0 .99990001 9.99951 E-5 
0 0 0 1 
" Next, the Wk(m,n) and the state diagram for Q4 (Figure 7) are used 
to compute the Pk(i,j). Only those Pk(i,j) with positive values are computed. 
-. , 
I' 
,.-. 
, 
,-
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2 PIC1,1) = WI C2,2) = .990314 
P1 C1,2) = W1 C2,2) W1 (2,1) = 2.41123 E-3 
P1 (1,3) = W1 (2,2) W1 (2,0) = 2.42004 E-3 
P1 (1,4) = W1 (2,1) . W1 (2,2) = 2.41123 E-3 
2 P1(1,5) = W1 (2,1) = 5.87088 E-6 
P1 (1,6) = W1 (2,1) . W1 (2,0) = 5.89235 E-6 
P1 (1,7) = W1 (2,0) W1 (2,2) = 2.42004 E-3 
P1 (1,8) = W1 (2,0) . WI (2,1)- = 5.89235 E-6 
2 P1 (1,9) = W1 (2,0) = 5.91389 E-6 
P2(1,1) = .9997334 
PZ(I,2) = 6.66500 E-5 
P2(1,3) = 6.66577 E-5 
P2(1,4) = 6.66500 E-5 
P2(1,5) = 4.44341 E-9 
P2(1,6) = 4.44392 E-9 
P2(1,7) = 6.66577 E-5 
P2(1,8) = 4.44392 E-9 
P2(1,9) = 4.44443 E-9 
P2(2,2) = W2(2,2) . WZ(I,l) = .999767 
P2(2,3) = W2(2,2) . W2(1,0) = 9.99818 E-5 
P2(2,5) = W2(2,1) W2(1,1) = 6.66522 E-5 
PZ(Z,6) = WZ(2,1) . WZ(I,O) = 6.66556 E-9 
PZ(Z,8) = WZ(Z,O) • WZ(1,1) = 6.66599 E-5 
P2(Z,9) = W2 (Z,0) W2(1,0) = 6.66633 E-9 
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P2(3,3) = W2(2,2) = .999867 
P2(3,6) = W2(2,1) = 6.66589 E-5 
P2(3,9) = W2 (2,0) = 6.66656 E-5 
P2(4,4) = W2(1,1) · W2(2,2) = .999767 
P2(4,5) = W2(1,1) • W2(2,1) = 6.66522 E-5 
P2(4,6) = W2(1,1) W2(2,0) = 6.66599 E-5 
P2 (4,7) = W2 (1,0) • W2(2,2) = 9.99818 E-5 
P2(4,8) = W2(1,0) • W2(2,1) = 6.66556 E-9 
P2 (4,9) = W2(1,0) · W2(2,0) = 6.66633 E-9 
P2(5,5) 
2 
= W2(1,1) = .999800 
P2(5,6) = W2 (1,1) . W2(1,0) = 9.99851 E-5 
P2(5,8) = W2(1,0) . W2(1,1) = 9.99851 E-5 
2 P2(5,9) = W2(1,0) = 9.99902 E-9 
P2(6,6) = W2(1,1) = .999900 
P2(6,9) = W2(1,0) 9.99951 E-5 
P2(7,7) = W2(2,2) = .999867 
P2(7,8) = W2(2,1) = 6.66589 E-5 
P2(7,9) = W2(2,0) = 6.66656 E-5 
P2(8,8) = W2(1,1) = .999900 
P2 (8,9) = W2 (1,0) = 9.99951 E-5 
P 2 (9,9) = 1. 00 
.-, 
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The PK(i,j) are used to compute the Pr(Vi) according to the 
equations previously derived. The results are: 
.990314 
Pr(V2) = 0 
Pr(V3) = 9.67988 E-3 
Pr(V4) = S.91389 E-6 
Pr(VS) = 3.2827939 
Finally, the probabilities for the function f4 are computed: 
Pr(F4 = 2) = Pr(L-
l (2)) = Pr(Vl ) 
= .990314 
Pr(F4 = 1) = Pr(L-l(l)) Pr(V2) + Pr(V3) 
= 9.67987 E-3 
Pr(F4 0) 
-1 + Pr(VS) = Pr(L (0)) = Pr(V4) 
= 6.242174 E-6 
Final Computations. The preceding four subsections show the derivations of 
Pr(F. = f.), f. € {0,1,2} for each of the four Q. subspaces. In this subsection, 
~ ~ ~ ~ 
the preceding results are combined to compute Pea ), the probability of 
n 
accomplishment level an' for each an € A. The remaining steps for each an 
are as follows: ~l 
• For each V = f2 
f3 
f4 
Pr(V) = ~ Pr(F. = f.) i=l ~ ~ 
-1 
• Sum the Pr(V) quantities for all V € Yl (an): 
-1 P(a) = Pr(Y l (a)) =E Pr(V). n n v€y-l(a) 
1 n 
The computation in the first step is based on the independence of the Q. 
~ 
subspaces. 
-1 V of Yl (an) 
analysis are 
The equation in the second step uses the fact that the elements 
are mutually exclusive. 
presented in Table 3 • 
The Pr(F.=f.) values from the preceding 
~ ~ 
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TABLE 3. CONTRIBUTIONS OF SUBSPACES TO MISSION OUTCOMES: 
Pr(F. = f.) where i = 1,2,3,4 and f. E {O,1,2}. 
~ ~ ~ 
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the Levell Model discussion, -1 [m]. From Y 1 (~o) = 
Pr ([~J) 4 = IT Pr(F .=2) = .974212. i=l l. 
Hence, Pea ) = .974212. 
a 
-1 
= {vI' v3 ' v4} where Next, y 1 (a1) v2 ' 
1 2 
1 or 2 1 
vI = v2 1 or 2 1 or 2 
1 or 2 1 or 2 
Pr(v1) = Pr(F1=1) . (pr(F2=1) + pr(F2=2») 
'(Pr(F4=1) + pr(F4=2)) 
= 4.211S3 E-3 
Similarly, 
Pr(v2) = 1.21039 E-3 
Pr(v3) = 1.08183 E-2 
9.52248 E-3 
Summing the Pr(Vj ) yields P(a1) = .02S763. 
v3 
-1 _ [ 1 Next, y (a2) - vS,v6,v7,v8J where 
o 1 or 2 1 or 2 
* v6 = 0 v7 = 1 or 2 
* 
o 
* * * 
1 
Since * represents "any feasible value", Pr (F. = * ) 
l. 
To insure numerical accuracy, the values Pr (F . = 0 ) 
l. 
Pr(F.=O) = l-(Pr(F.=l) + Pr(F.=2». 
l. l. l. 
Using the probability values from Table 3, 
2 
2 
1 
v4 
or 2 
v8 = 
= 1.0. 
are computed 
Pr(vS) 
Pr(v6) 
Pr(v7) 
Pr(F1= 0) = 0 
[Pr(F1=1) + pr(F1=2~ 
= [Pr(F1=1) + pr(F1=2~ 
= 1.28S904 E-S 
. Pr(F2=0) = 6.88218 E-6 
~r(F2=1) + Pr(F2=2D . Pr(F3=0) 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 or 2 
1 or 2 
1 or 2 
0 
as follows: 
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Pr(v8) = Ilr (F1=1) + pr(F1=2~ ~r(F2=1) + pr(F2=2B 
. ~r(F3:=1) + pr(F3=2~ . Pr(F4=0) 
= 6.24205 E-6 
Summing the above pr(vj ) yields P(a2) = 28.9833 E-6. 
In summary, the mission outcome probabilities are: 
Safe, no diversion: P(a) .974212 
o 
Safe, diversion 
Unsafe 
.025763 
-6 25.9833 x 10 . 
~ 
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Dependencies Not Captured 
As noted in the discussion of the application of performability 
analysis to the dual-dual problem (see the section entitled "Analysis Results"), 
an error was made in selecting groups of components which were independent 
with respect to their impacts on the mission outcome. The following paragraphs 
explain the dependencies in question and provide an upper bound for their 
probability of occurrence. 
The performability analysis solution treated the components in inde-
pendent sets. In particular, components 1 and Z were in one set (call it Cl ) 
while components 3, 4, and 5 comprised a different set (call it CZ). The 
probabilities of set Cl resulting in mission accomplishment level a j (aO=no 
diversion, safe; al=diversion, safe; aZ=unsafe) were computed independent 
of the state of the set C2 • Similarly, the probabilities of C2 resulting in 
a j were computed independent of Cl • However, Cl and C2 are ~ independent. 
There are two cases (i.e., mission profiles) in which Cl and C2 
must be considered simultaneously to determine the correct mission outcome. 
In each case, the CAT II landing is initiated, after which both DAD's fail. 
In this state, the CAT II landing can still be completed (even though the 
safe flight conditions are not satisfied). A subsequent failure of the radar 
altimeter or of both VORIs causes violation of the conditions required to 
complete the CAT II landing, thereby causing a diversion. When a diversion 
occurs, the safe flight conditions must be met or the aircraft is lost. Since 
both DAD's are failed, the aircraft is lost. When the sets CI and Cz were 
treated independently, both of the above cases were treated as if the mission 
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outcome was diversion and safe flight. Note that if either the radar 
altimeter or both VORIs fail first, (i.e., prior to failure of both DAD's) 
then the CAT II landing is aborted and the aircraft is lost. These possibilities 
were captured correctly by the analysis. 
To compute an upper bound for the probability of occurrence of the 
two above cases, let El represent the two cases; i.e., 
Let 
Next, let 
El==the event the CAT II landing is initiated; and both DAD's 
fail before the landing is completed; and then either the 
radar altimeter or the second VOR fails before the landing 
is completed. 
E2=the event the CAT II landing is initiated, and both DAD's 
and either the radar altimeter or both VORIs fail before 
the landing is completed. 
E3=the event the CAT II landing is initiated. 
According to the well-known Baye's Theorem, 
Pr(E2)=Pr(E2IE3)·pr(E3)· 
Since pr(E3) ~ 1, then pr(E2) ~ preE21 E3) • 
Combining this inequality with Pr(EI) ~ Pr(E2) implies 
Pr(EI) ~ Pr(E2IE3)· 
Hence, an upper bound for the event of interest, EI , is the probability 
both DAD's fail in a two minute period and either the radar altimeter or 
i 
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both VORIs fail in a two minute period. Using the MTBF data from Table 1 of 
the dual-dual problem statement, 
( 
_ 1 2)2 
~ l-e 2000·60 
and therefore 
-14 pr(El ) ~ 1.33 x 10 • 
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